EXHIBIT 3

Case 23-03037 Document 61-3 Filed in TXSB on 06/13/23 Page 2 of 102

DKT NO: X06-UWY-CV186046436-S : COMPLEX LITIGATION DKT

ERICA LAFFERTY : JUDICIAL DISTRICT WATERBURY.

v. : AT WATERBURY, CONNECTICUT

ALEX EMRIC JONES : SEPTEMBER 6, 2022

DKT NO: X06-UWY-CV186046437-S

WILLIAM SHERLACH

V.

ALEX EMRIC JONES

DKT NO: X06-UWY-CV186046438-S

WILLIAM SHERLACH

v.

ALEX EMRIC JONES

MOTIONS

BEFORE THE HONORABLE BARBARA N. BELLIS, JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

Representing the Plaintiff(s):

ATTORNEY CHRISTOPHER MATTEI ATTORNEY ALINOR STERLING ATTORNEY MATTHEW BLUMENTHAL Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder 350 Fairfield Ave. Ste 501 Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604

ATTORNEY NORMAN PATTIS for Jones Defendants

Recorded By:
Darlene Orsatti

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Darlene Orsatti
Court Recording Monitor
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Waterbury, CT 06702

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EXHIBIT

THE COURT: All right. Good morning, everyone. This is Judge Bellis, we're on the record in the three <u>Lafferty versus Jones</u> related matters. Lead docket number 18-6046436. If counsel could please identify themselves for the record.

ATTY. STERLING: Yes, your Honor. Alinor Sterling for the plaintiffs, and with me are my colleagues Matt Blumenthal and Chris Mattei.

ATTY. PATTIS: Good afternoon, Judge. Norm
Pattis for Free Speech Systems and Alex Jones.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right. So just by my count we have 11 sets of motions to get through this afternoon. I did see some recent filings, and so my first question is whether Attorney Pattis has had an opportunity to review them.

ATTY. PATTIS: Attorney Sterling, Judge, gave me a heads up an hour and half or so, and we reviewed them orally. I'm prepared to argue them, even though I've not yet studied them, but I'm confident that I've been adequately briefed and understand the issues.

THE COURT: Okay. So two issues with jurors.

So - and I prefer not to state names, so hopefully we can avoid that. But, alternate number 5. Our last alternate. Although she never raised an issue with us, contacted Mr. Ferraro and is claiming an extreme hardship because she will only get paid for two

weeks. I will also tell you that the juror that we were waiting to hear back from, alternate juror number 3. Has gotten back to Mr. Ferraro. He will only get paid for four weeks, and he's claiming a hardship. He also apparently works a second job, which I don't think we heard. So I've been giving it some thought. I mean if we excuse both, it sounds like we're going to have to pick another alternate. But I wanted to just briefly explore the issue of how long the trial is going to be. Because I'm wondering if in fact it ends up being only four weeks, if we can just keep alternate number 3.

So I think I probably overestimated the length of trial. So I think what I'm possibly putting out there is, if everyone agrees, and I'm not asking you to agree with me because I don't know. But if we think that we can get it done within the four weeks, we can tell him that we overestimated and that we think it will be done in four weeks. And if in fact there are delays, we could always excuse him after the four weeks if he chooses to opt out. So that's one thought.

So Attorney Pattis, why don't I start with you for a change, and see what your thoughts are on alternate number 3 and alternate number 5.

ATTY. PATTIS: Well, alternate number 5, Judge, it's unfortunate that it seems to me that the way

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this has been going, an ex post facto claim of extreme hardship's been enough, I think in at least one other occasion. So I would defer to the Court on I wouldn't object if the person were excused. As to number three. Judge, I think I have to defer to Attorney Mattei because he's got the bulk of the evidence. My case now I suspect will take two days. Earlier I thought three or four. I haven't seen the plaintiffs exhibit list yet. We exchanged them today. But I've got a pretty good idea what's in it. But Attorney Mattei and I have had discussions about whether they were going to call all the experts they've disclosed and so forth. And so I think I have to defer to him, Judge. I think four weeks is tight from my prospective. They're four-day trial weeks. On the theory that Murphy's Law applies, we're likely to lose a day or two for one thing or another.

THE COURT: All right. Attorney Mattei.

ATTY. MATTEI: Your Honor, I think that we are going to be able to do it in four weeks. Our case, as often happens as we approach trial is slimming.

And I think that your suggestion of kind of keeping him on, and if it appears that we're going to go into a fifth week, giving him the option at that point, it may be that having sat on the jury for four weeks, he wants to stay if we go into a fifth week.

I have shared the Courts concern from the beginning, that we want to make sure that we can get to the end with six jurors. And so my thought is to keep him, given my expectation that I think we will be done within four weeks. And if not, only very slightly over.

ATTY. PATTIS: Judge, may - did our potential juror give any indication about the nature of his second job? Is he going to be able to defer it and give us his full attention and so forth? And get enough sleep, you know -

THE COURT: I suppose we can have Mr. Ferraro get more information. But my thought was, he didn't raise it at all, and I think his main concern was the full-time job that he would get paid in full for four weeks for. So, I think it sounds like we all agree to let alternate number 5 go based on her claim of hardship. Is that correct? So we'll do that.

ATTY. MATTEI: Right. I didn't mention juror number 5, Judge, but that's fine. Yes.

ATTY. PATTIS: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. And so why don't we do this. Why don't we have Mr. Ferraro reach out to alternate number 3 and give him - tell him that we believe we might be able to get it done in the four weeks, and that if it does in fact go longer than the four weeks, he can immediately opt out. And if he is

agreeable with that, Ron will - Mr. Ferraro will let me know, and if he's not, I will report back to you. My only concern is if we lose someone else. One or two people before now and Tuesday. And you never know with Covid and everything else. The only time that I can see to pick is Monday if we really need to. Does anyone have a real problem with Monday, if we needed to pick another alternate?

ATTY. MATTEI: If we have to Judge, we'll be there.

ATTY. PATTIS: Yeah, I'm in the same - I mean - THE COURT: Nobody wants to. Right.

ATTY. PATTIS: Knocking on wood here. Covid is moving through my office knocking off one lawyer at a time. Fortunately, my office is separated from everyone else's. They - so, hopefully I'll be fine.

THE COURT: All right. So why don't we see what happens with alternate number 3. And we may not have any problems, and we may have a full panel, but we will definitely know. Maybe Ron, you could make the calls Thursday, so that we will know Thursday night or Friday morning whether we're going to have to pick on Monday. Okay.

THE CLERK: Sure, your Honor. I was planning on calling him today if we're done before five, or I will call him tomorrow morning.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. That sounds like

Then the only other housekeeping thing I had 1 a plan. on my agenda was, to address the plaintiff's 2 3 objection to the media coverage. So what we need to 4 do is slot a time for that and then notify the media 5 representatives. 6 ATTY. PATTIS: I missed that filing. Is there a 7 docket number on that? 8 THE COURT: There is. 9 ATTY. STERLING: Your Honor, Attorney Sterling 10 for the record. Are you referring to the sort of 11 paragraph long filing we made, where we said that it 12 was possible some of our clients -13 THE COURT: Yes. 14 ATTY. STERLING: I think that we have worked 15 through that, and the Court doesn't need to address 16 that. We're not going to object to the media 17 coverage. 18 THE COURT: Okay. So we can cross that off the 19 list. All right. So any - before I get to these 11 20 sets of motions here, any housekeeping issues, 21 Attorney Pattis, from your end? 22 ATTY. PATTIS: No. I think Attorney Mattei and 23 I have been in extensive communication trying to 24 arrange - trying to reach agreements on everything 25 possible. So I don't think we need - I don't 26 perceive us as needing Court intervention at this

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point.

1 THE COURT: All right. You agree, Attorney 2 Mattei? You're muted. 3 ATTY. MATTEI: Yeah. At this point I don't think we have any housekeeping matters other than, 4 5 your Honor, I'm not going to be arguing today. Would it be all right if I shut off my video while I kind 6 7 of observe? 8 THE COURT: I don't see why not. Who's arguing, 9 Attorney Sterling or Attorney Blumenthal, or you're 10 taking turns? ATTY. STERLING: Your Honor, Attorney Sterling. 11 12 I have the bulk of it. Attorney Blumenthal has two. THE COURT: Okay. Which two do you have, 13 14 Attorney Blumenthal? 15 ATTY. BLUMENTHAL: Your Honor, I have the motion 16 to compel regarding the Dew Bidondi text, and I have 17 the motion in limine, or objection to the motion in 18 limine, regarding anti-government extremism and white 19 supremacy. 20 THE COURT: Thank you. 21 All right. So because we are up to entry 22 number, I think 965. I just want to make sure for 23 each set of motions that I am ruling on the exact 24 right motion, and the exact right objection and 25 reply. And that I've reviewed everything. And I 26 think with the - I was able to review the recent

filings. I was more concerned about Attorney Pattis.

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But I think when it comes to the recent filings, you will definitely need to correct me with respect to some of the entry numbers, because I have a long list, and I did not correct and add in the new entry number.

So I have a certain spread across my whole desk here, and I would like to - I'd like to take it in the order that I've sort of spread it out. So hopefully you all can work with me on that. So what I have first, and this would be with Attorney Sterling. I have - and again, I definitely want you all to correct me with your entry numbers. And this is regarding the requests for admissions. So I have the plaintiffs' motion to compel entry number 923. Then I have the defendant's objection at 941. And I have the plaintiffs reply at 953.

ATTY. STERLING: And your Honor, which motion to compel is this? I just -

ATTY. PATTIS: The request -

THE COURT: I have the - regarding the request for admissions dated - this is your underlying motion is 923, dated August 16th. And I understand that it's now limited to one request, which is number 244. And the -

ATTY. STERLING: Your Honor, that's -

THE COURT: Okay. So this is not an objection that was made, it was an insufficient knowledge

answer. Okay. So Attorney Sterling, do you have anything that you want to say about this?

ATTY. STERLING: Well, first let me, your Honor, go through the docket numbers, confirm them back to you. So I have 923, the motion to compel adequate answers. Responded to in docket number 941, which is the omnibus response. And then there is a reply, which is docket number 953. Okay. There isn't a lot to cover here, your Honor. And the request was 244 to the content of each of the foregoing videos was broadcast by some or all of the following media.

It's already - so and then per - there's an affidavit. I think the defendants already agreed to consider this response an answer. So I mean, I think - I think we should have an answer here. There's also a stipulation regarding the authenticity of all the videos in issue. It's really not in dispute that they were broadcast. So it seems to me it should be admitted. I'm not sure what the remaining issue is on the defendants' side.

THE COURT: I don't know either. Attorney Pattis.

ATTY. PATTIS: So I - initially we had some discussions about this. We entered a stipulation that all of the videos that we produced are authentic and they'll be no need to authenticate them. One of the problems with the case is being - my client's

inability to tell what was broadcast where. And so I understand what Attorney Sterling is saying. If we're not going to object to their authenticity, why are being coy or hesitant about where they were broadcasting. And the fact is, we simply don't know. I mean and I don't know - and hence insufficient knowledge. And there's no means to find out. Much to my surprise in working with these clients over the years, there is no central registry log or database that you can consult. THE COURT: Well, Attorney Pattis, normally I

would say that there's a response to part of the inquiry. But here, the whole entire inquiry and each sub-part was a no knowledge. It would seem to me that some of it could be responded to. No?

ATTY. PATTIS: Possibly. But it's going to be speculative. If it's directed to Alex Jones, I mean, I don't think he knows. I genuinely don't.

ATTY. STERLING: Your Honor, for the record, Attorney Sterling. If I may? The request over 244 asks for the admission. The content of each of the foregoing videos was broadcast by some or all of the following media. Not all.

THE COURT: Right.

ATTY. STERLING: So -

ATTY. PATTIS: I get that -

THE COURT: I understand that, Attorney

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Sterling. That's why I asked Attorney Pattis why we don't have a partial answer.

ATTY. PATTIS: I don't know that he knows. I mean he says he doesn't know. So we're not trying to stonewall anyone here, but by stipulating to the authenticity of them, we've given what I can. I'm not going to dispute that what I gave them is authentic. But I don't think Alex knows.

THE COURT: But isn't it not just what he knows that he has an obligation to find out the information within his power?

ATTY. PATTIS: Good luck with that, Judge.

We've been defaulted for a reason. I don't think it

- and I didn't mean to be glib or sarcastic, I saw

you raise your eyebrows. I wasn't trying to be

sarcastic. There is just no their, their, when it

comes to an internal organization, or ability to

reconstruct historic facts.

THE COURT: Do I think when I look at this there is an obligation to - there's clearly some part of this that can be admitted. I'm sure based on what you're saying that some part of it is a no knowledge. Whether some part can be denied, I don't know. But, I don't - I understand that, and I accept your representation that Mr. Jones personally can't answer the entire question fully. But it would seem to me that at least part of it can be responded to.

1 So, I think what I'm going to do here is, order 2 that an amended answer be filed on or before 3 September 8th. And otherwise the matter that's not responded to will be admitted - deemed admitted. 4 5 ATTY. PATTIS: May I request of Attorney 6 Sterling, that she send me that in a separate 7 pleading as a new request to admit, just number 244, 8 for ease of transmission to people who are going need 9 to review it. 10 ATTY. STERLING: That's fine. Of course. 11 ATTY. PATTIS: Thank you. 12 THE COURT: So just bear with me, please? 13 So I would like to take up next - and again, we 14 just need to triple check these entry numbers. 15 plaintiffs' motion for order. And this is on the 16 issue of the Free Speech Systems and PQPR. I have 17 that at entry number 926. I have the defendant's 18 objection at 941. And I have the plaintiff's reply 19 at 951. 20 ATTY. PATTIS: Judge, the plaintiff's reply? 21 I'm sorry, you cut out. 22 THE COURT: 951. 23 ATTY. PATTIS: Thank you. 24 THE COURT: But I just want them confirmed if 25 you don't mind. 26 ATTY. STERLING: Yes, your Honor. Attorney 27 Sterling here. And sorry your Honor, I keep stepping

out of the camera because my sort of rainbow of motions is spread just outside camera reach.

So I have this is 926, the motion. Line 41, the omnibus response. 951, the reply in support.

THE COURT: Okay. So whenever you're ready, please?

ATTY. STERLING: Yes, your Honor.

So, this is really straight forward, and there are a couple motions like this. This is a situation where Attorney Brittany - excuse me, this is - sorry. Apologizes. This is Alex Jones testimony establishing the existence of a management agreement between PQPR, or a management agreement for PQPR. That's testified to by him. It's also testified to by Lydia Hernandez.

We requested the production of that management agreement. The management agreement is significant because the Jones defendants are claiming that PQPR is an independent corporate entity. That does not appear from the evidence to be the case at all. So having the management agreement would allow us to cross-examine their contention that it exists independently. The failure to produce it, indicates otherwise.

So what we've done, your Honor, is we moved to compel. Nothing has been produced. The response is that counsel has been advised that it does not exist.

1 And so - but that's just contrary to the sworn 2 testimony in the case. So what we've requested is a 3 sanction, and this would be a sanction under 13 14 3 or 13 14 4. 13 14 4 allows the Court to preclude the 4 5 entry and evidence of certain matters. 13 14 3 gives 6 the Court the ability to take some matters as established. 7 8 THE COURT: Attorney Sterling, I -9 ATTY. STERLING: Yes. 10 THE COURT: - want to interrupt you. So, I read this motion as asking for an order that it be 11 12 compelled. What did I miss? 13 ATTY. STERLING: We did ask for an order that it 14 be compelled. There was then a representation by 15 Attorney Pattis, that it can't be produced. In our 16 reply we then requested a sanction. 17 THE COURT: All right. So go ahead. I 18 interrupted you. 19 ATTY. STERLING: Okay. 20 So what the sanction, your Honor, should be is 21 that it is taken as established that Free Speech 22 Systems and PQPR are not independent entities. 23 They're one in the same. And that's the - you know, 24 that's the core issue that we're dealing with here. 25 That's what we were trying to explore. That's what 26 we can't explore because we're not able to get the

management agreement.

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THE COURT: All right. Attorney Pattis, the ball's in your court. But I have to agree with the movant on this, that what we have are I suppose as evidence under oath from Ms. Hernandez and Mr. Jones, that there is an agreement and that I merely have unsupported statements that it doesn't exist. Are you in a position that you are going to be submitting some evidence? Should there be an evidentiary hearing on this? Because I'm not -

ATTY. PATTIS: I can -

THE COURT: - going to just consider it's not proper for me to just consider unsupported statements. So what do you suggest?

ATTY. PATTIS: I will get an affidavit from the debtor in possession, Free Speech Systems. He checked his files. I'm in a better position postbankruptcy then I was before, because there's a management team in there trying to create structures of accountability and whatnot. I'm told that there is none - no such thing. And so if the - and I will be happily - I will happily get you a brief affidavit that Mr. Schwartz has searched and cannot find it. If it exists.

THE COURT: All right. But then I think we have an evidentiary hearing, because Mr. Schwartz, what is his role?

ATTY. PATTIS: He's the management consultant

1 for the debtor in possession in the bankruptcy. 2 THE COURT: Right. 3 ATTY. PATTIS: And so he is effectively the manager of the entity right now. 4 5 THE COURT: I understand. But it would seem 6 that he's even further removed from - it would seem 7 that Mr. Jones would have knowledge and be more 8 familiar with it. So I suppose when we - if we have 9 an evidentiary hearing, and I have to weigh the 10 evidence, that's going to be an issue. And Ms. 11 Hernandez. Refresh my memory as to her role. 12 ATTY. PATTIS: Home or business office person, 13 for lack of a better word, who had personal knowledge 14 of the relationship and the cash flow. 15 apparently saw at some point, what she testified was 16 a management agreement between Jones and PQPR. Or at 17 least FSS and PQPR. 18 THE COURT: All right. So just tell me 19 procedurally how you want to proceed here because we 20 are on the eve of trial. So I assume I have what I 21 I assume Attorney Pattis will get something 22 that says in essence, I looked, and I couldn't find 23 anything. And then I'll have to weigh the evidence. 24 Are we going to have - are you wanting to rely on 25 affidavits, or you're wanting an evidentiary hearing 26 on Monday? Tell me what your proposal is.

ATTY. PATTIS: I'd rely on the affidavit's,

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Judge. I mean, I think - I mean, candidly it depends on what the stakes are. I mean my view is that frankly it would support my claim that they were independent entities to find this agreement if there is one. Because you don't make an agreement in writing with yourself. So the sanction seems counterintuitive to me.

In the absence of it, I don't know how we prove that - I don't know how we establish that they're not independent. That seems like a logical leap to me.

It strikes me that if we don't produce it, that's cross - for cross-examination of Mr. Jones. Who apparently once testified that he saw it and will - I presume testify now that he doesn't have it. Doesn't know where it is.

So I - if the Court - I mean it is a central it is a hotly contested issue, the degree to which
FSS and PQPR interact. And there has been an IRS
finding on that, just within the last several days.
I have not seen a writing to that effect yet. So
they are in fact independent of one another, at least
from the eyes of one federal agency. The plaintiffs
need to establish that they're not to eliminate a
source of debt and try to inflate the net worth of
the conglomerated entities.

So I don't want to give that issue up without a fight. But if my witnesses say it doesn't exist, I

1 don't know what else I can do. 2 THE COURT: Right. Well, if I were ruling on it 3 right now, I would - the only evidence that's before me are - is the testimony that was mentioned of Mr. 4 5 Jones and Ms. Hernandez. So I could rule now, but 6 what I'm trying to do is, give you an opportunity to 7 support your position -8 ATTY. PATTIS: Well, we'll take the 9 opportunity -10 THE COURT: - with some evidence. ATTY. PATTIS: We'll take the opportunity. We'd 11 12 also ask you to consider rejecting it as untimely. 13 We're on the eve on trial. There's no reason this 14 couldn't have been done long ago. And I've got 15 plenty to do to get ready for next week, and I'm not 16 looking to gather more affidavits. 17 But if the Courts not persuaded by that 18 argument, I'd ask for a brief period to get these affidavits. 19 20 ATTY. STERLING: Your Honor, may I - may I -21 THE COURT: Sure. 22 ATTY. STERLING: So we are late. This was filed 23 some time ago, and it really does require an 24 affidavit responding to it. 25 THE COURT: Well, that's - I - we covered that. 26 ATTY. STERLING: Exactly, your Honor. But so 27 what I am saying is, if the defendants are going to

be given an opportunity to provide the Court with an affidavit, we'd really like to see it right away.

Because I can't judge whether we need an evidentiary hearing until I see the affidavit.

ATTY. PATTIS: Well, Alinor, I'll tell you what it's going to say. I mean, it's not going to say any more than I am Mark Schwartz, I became debtor in possession or whatever his title is on such and such a date. I have complete access to the files. I was approached on such and such a date to look for such and such a document. I have diligently inquired and made inquiries through others. I find no evidence that there is - I find no document, do not believe there is one. That's what he's going to say. And what Alex is going to say, we'll find out. It's not going to be any more than that.

THE COURT: All right. So I would say any counter affidavit, or I mean - was there any other deposition testimony, Attorney Pattis, that you would have wanted to submit, that you didn't submit?

ATTY. PATTIS: No.

THE COURT: Okay. So any counter affidavit on or before the close of business tomorrow.

ATTY. PATTIS: Judge, I'm in the State Supreme

Court tomorrow morning, and going to lose part of the

day. Is it possible to give me until Thursday?

THE COURT: Okay. That's the 8th.

ATTY. PATTIS: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: And Attorney Sterling, you may want to respond to the affidavit. If it says nothing more than what Attorney Pattis represented, and I accept his word, I'm not imagining you're looking to respond or have — and Attorney Pattis is not asking for an evidentiary hearing.

ATTY. STERLING: No.

THE COURT: All right. So I'm going to rule on it either the night of September 8th, or the next morning. But if it does - if it has any material detail that's different, I will let Mr. Ferraro know and he'll reach out and we'll see what we're going to do.

ATTY. STERLING: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So Attorney Blumenthal, I think this is you. So I now have the plaintiffs notice or motion regarding the Dew Bidondi text. I have that at 929. I have the defendant's omnibus objection at 941. And I have the plaintiffs reply at 945. But again, I don't know if any of the new filings are going to change any of these entry numbers.

ATTY. BLUMENTHAL: That sounds - those are correct, your Honor. Your underlying - well, our underlying motion was at 875. Your order was at 875.20. And the defendant's objection to the

original motion was at 882. And your docket numbers otherwise are correct.

THE COURT: All right. So we have my ruling.

We have no production and you're now going to address sanctions.

ATTY. BLUMENTHAL: Yes, your Honor. There are really two things at issue with regard to the sanction at issue, which is an adverse inference with regard to what the text that were failed to be produced and were destroyed would show. The prejudice or materiality of them, and also the intentionality with which they were destroyed.

I'll start with the prejudice, which the defendants have said there is none. But just the opposite. These texts are on an issue that is hotly contested in this case and is highly significant to the plaintiffs' damages case. And that is the control that Free Speech Systems exercised over Dan Biondi, and the timing of that control. And having those text would provide the plaintiffs an ability potentially to prove the timing of that control, specifically that it extended through the time that they were exchanged.

It also deprives the plaintiffs of the ability to test the veracity of the accounts that were given of those texts in the depositions. The defendants have essentially said, we have their deposition

testimony. Good enough. But that's the whole purpose of documentary evidence and exhibits at a deposition. At least in part. That purpose is to allow the person taking the deposition, or the party taking the deposition, to test those statements. And so the plaintiffs have been deprived of that.

They've also been deprived of quality evidence.

Of high-quality evidence. Documentary evidence on this subject matter would be the equivalent of a star witness and having just witnesses recollection through deposition testimony or live testimony, is far less high quality for the plaintiffs and for the jury.

And moreover archingly these text are fundamentally about Dan Bidondi's deposition testimony. And the veracity of that testimony more generally. And also whether and how it may have been affected by Free Speech Systems and Rob Dew. And so the plaintiffs have been deprived of documentary evidence to test, first of all the veracity of Mr. Biondi's deposition testimony more generally, but also with regard to what they said in particular.

On the intentionality issue. The defendants have said essentially that Mr. Dew did not intend when he slammed his phone in his pickup trucks tailgate, to destroy evidence for the purpose of depriving the plaintiffs of it. But that's not the

test of intentionality recognized by our courts.

Beers, the Beers case specifically says that by
intentionality we do not mean that there must have
been intent to perpetrate a fraud by the party or his
agent. But merely that the evidence had been
disposed of intentionally and not merely destroyed
inadvertently.

And in this case, we think that the Court can only come to the conclusion that under that definition, and the definition that the courts have generally observed, that these texts were destroyed intentionally. First of all, Bidondi himself is a potential agent of Free Speech Systems, depending on how you interpret their testimony, and depending on what the text show at the time. And he admits that he destroyed them intentionally.

Additionally, given the realities of cell phones in the moderate age, the failure to provide or preserve these text over the time period that Free Speech Systems knew that it needed to preserve and provide them. Three years from the beginning of the first discovery that demanded them, and nine months from multiple specific demands for those texts in particular.

THE COURT: Attorney Blumenthal, can you just - ATTY. BLUMENTHAL: Yes.

THE COURT: - refresh my memory, please? So the

1 text messages were what dates? 2 ATTY. BLUMENTHAL: Let's see. The text messages 3 in particular were from July, I believe July 2021. I'm just looking it up right now. In advance of Mr. 4 5 Bidondi's deposition. So Mr. Bidondi said it was about the fourth of July. 6 7 THE COURT: That the text messages were 8 exchanged. 9 ATTY. BLUMENTHAL: Yes. 10 THE COURT: 2021. And when - so put aside Mr. 11 Bidondi. But what is Mr. Dew's relationship with 12 Free Speech Systems? 13 ATTY. BLUMENTHAL: At the time -14 THE COURT: At the time the text messages were 15 exchanged. 16 ATTY. BLUMENTHAL: He was Alex Jones' right-hand 17 man. One of the most senior members of the 18 management team. 19 THE COURT: All right. So he's an employee of 20 Free Speech Systems. 21 ATTY. BLUMENTHAL: Yes, your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Okay. And at the time the text 23 messages were exchanged, was there - were there 24 discovery requests that were propounded that would 25 have required Free Speech Systems or Mr. Jones to 26 produce the text messages? Putting aside the 27 subpoena on Mr. Bidondi.

1 ATTY. BLUMENTHAL: Yes, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: And then just refresh my 3 recollection so I don't have to go through all my notes here. When was the - when did Mr. Dew's cell 4 5 phone get damaged? 6 ATTY. BLUMENTHAL: In either late January or 7 early February 2022. He couldn't determine with more 8 specificity. 9 THE COURT: So that was the timeframe they were 10 created in July of 2021, and his phone was not damaged until around six months later? 11 12 ATTY. BLUMENTHAL: Yes, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 14 ATTY. BLUMENTHAL: So your Honor, as I was just 15 saying. Basically with the realities of the way cell 16 phones work and how people use cell phones these 17 days. If you fail to preserve or cause to be 18 preserved these sorts of texts, or data, over this 19 sort of length of time, it's almost inevitable that 20 something is going to happen to them. The way people 21 use their phones and replace them. And that's 22 exactly what happened in this case. 23 In addition, Dew was a senior member of the 24 management team. He should have known that he needed 25 to preserve these texts. He didn't do so. 26 admitted it. He should have taken measures, even

after he put them in his pickup trucks tailgate, and

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then slammed the tailgate on them — or on the phone. He should have and he should have known to go to some measure to recover them. Some sort of technical assistance. He failed to do that. And he's admitted it in his deposition. And I just think it's useful to think about this from a more broad context, about what the evidence shows happened here. Most of the cases that have decided that evidence was not destroyed intentionally, deal with parties who do not have notice that they need to preserve it. Or some sort of external factor, like a cleaning service picking up a soda can that's on a desk and throwing it in the trash.

And what we have here is, an individual who knew that he had to preserve these texts, and an entity that knew that they had to preserve them. Failed to do it over an extended, extended period of time. And we have an admission from the individual himself, that he took the phone, he placed it in the tailgate of the truck, and then he slammed the tailgate of the truck on it. And then failed to take any additional measures besides attempting to turn it on, to try to recover the data.

And so what the defense is really asking us to do, is to look - or the Court to demand evidence of what was in Mr. Dew's heart, with regard to these texts. And that's exactly what courts have said here

in Connecticut, is not required.

THE COURT: All right. Attorney Pattis, it looked to me when I looked at it the first time, and it looks to me now. That it should have been produced. It should have been preserved. And okay, neither were done, and the phone gets destroyed.

ATTY. PATTIS: So addressing Attorney
Blumenthal's argument. There is no prejudice because
strictly speaking, Dan Bidondi's not a relevant
witness to this case. There is zero evidence that
Bidondi had any contact with any of the plaintiffs,
and to the degree that they'd keep - they'd seek to
assert that Infowars quote, unquote, harassed the
plaintiffs. Bidondi came to Connecticut and harassed
other people.

And if they're going to advance a 4-4 theory, they've not yet given me a notice of that, so strictly there can be no prejudice because Mr.

Bidondi is irrelevant. Whether he was under control, Infowars control, when he went to visit third parties and behaved like an ass. Is neither here nor there.

Mr. Blumenthal - Attorney Blumenthal, sorry, places a very charitable cast on the evidence. He suggests that Dew went to his truck, placed the phone in there with the intention to destroy it.

I don't read the testimony that way. I read it more as an accident. As to whether it should have

been preserved in July of 2021. I don't recall when the first request for communications of this sort occurred. I don't recall whether it pertained to Bidondi. So I reject the contention that its prejudicial to the case that they're putting on or -

THE COURT: Can we just back up for a second.

Attorney Pattis, my recollection is that at the

September deposition at the time Attorney Wolman was appearing for the defendants.

ATTY. PATTIS: Um-hum.

on the record then. So when I look at this, it produced and should have been preserved. And then this is what happens to evidence all the time when people don't fully and fairly comply. The passage of time, things happen. And so regardless of whether it was intentional or not, it sure doesn't sound like Mr. Dew, who was an employee of Free Speech Systems produced it or preserved it. And that's sort of a problem.

ATTY. PATTIS: It is sort of a problem. But I don't think that it's - it's neither prejudicial - it's just not prejudicial. And so to say that - to draw this adverse - I don't think you can claim that it was intentional spoliation. I'm not sure that Connecticut recognizes negligence spoliation. So I'm not sure that the plaintiff's are entitled to the

adverse inference that they seek. And so that's my answer.

THE COURT: All right. Attorney Blumenthal, did you want to respond briefly?

ATTY. BLUMENTHAL: Yes. Just two very brief notes. Your Honor, one thing that I didn't mention in my description of Mr. Dew, is that he on several occasions served as Free Speech Systems corporate representative in depositions, both here and elsewhere. And so that I think is a relevant fact in evaluating intentionality.

Additionally, contrary to Attorney Pattis' argument, the default establishes that what Mr. Bidondi did was under the control of Free Speech Systems. So that relationship is important for the plaintiffs to be able to explore through the highest quality testimony, and as a result, the prejudice is significant in addition to all the other reasons that I've mentioned previously.

ATTY. PATTIS: Briefly, Judge?

THE COURT: Sure.

ATTY. PATTIS: We obviously disagree about what the default means. And I'll address that later in motions. The fact of the matter is, that there is zero evidence that Bidondi had anything to do with any of these plaintiffs. And I was startled to see the plaintiffs - I guess the plaintiffs are serious

1 about offering him as a witness. I may seek to 2 address that by way of a motion, because I don't see 3 any nexus between Bidondi and any of the people claiming money damages here. 4 5 THE COURT: Attorney Blumenthal, again, refresh 6 my recollection. What are the allegations in the complaint about Bidondi? 7 8 ATTY. BLUMENTHAL: I'm not quoting, I'm 9 paraphrasing, your Honor. But the allegations were 10 that he was an Infowars reporter at relevant times under their control. And that he harassed 11 12 individuals in and around Newtown, in a company - in 13 the company if Wolfgang Halbig. And that the 14 plaintiffs were aware of him. 15 THE COURT: All right. So I'll take this under 16 advisement, and hopefully get you a ruling later this 17 afternoon or tomorrow. 18 ATTY. STERLING: If I may? Attorney Sterling 19 for the record. I do want to flag - I know the Court 20 had an approach that it wanted to take with regard to the motions. 21 22 THE COURT: I do. 23 ATTY. STERLING: And I don't mean to disorder 24 that approach. But I did want to raise that I think 25 a lot of what we're doing dances around the central 26 issue -

27 THE COURT: I understand that.

1 ATTY. STERLING: Okay. Thank you, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: But I have to follow the way it's 3 laid out on this desk, or I'm going to get lost with all these orders I have to do. But I do understand 4 5 that. 6 ATTY. STERLING: Of course, your Honor. I just 7 don't want to have any of our arguments be understood 8 as -9 ATTY. PATTIS: No motion is an island. I think 10 she's trying to say. 11 THE COURT: Yes. 12 ATTY. STERLING: Yes, exactly. Thank you. 13 THE COURT: I think we all know that. All 14 right. 15 ATTY. STERLING: Okay. Thank you, your Honor. 16 THE COURT: So I'm going to turn to defendants' 17 motion on the white supremacy issue. I have it entry 18 number 866. I have the plaintiff's objection at 890. 19 And I have no reply being filed. So if those entry 20 numbers are correct -ATTY. PATTIS: They are in the defendants' view, 21 22 Judge. 23 THE COURT: I beg your pardon? 24 ATTY. PATTIS: They are in the defendants' view, 25 Judge. Those entries are correct. Yes. THE COURT: Okay. So whenever you're ready. 26 27 ATTY. PATTIS: This pertains to the proposed

testimony of a witness expert from the Southern

Poverty Law Center named Dr. Beirich. And my

understanding is, she's being offered to provide

jurors with context of Mr. Jones in the American

political talking head landscape. And that he will

be situated as a vocal and visible right-wing figure

on the airways.

All of that's fine and I think is appropriate and will assist the jury. Our argument is applying 4-3. Having him characterized as a white supremist is more pre - is unduly prejudicial. Not one of the plaintiffs in this case is anything other than Caucasian, as near as I can tell. Race isn't an issue in this case. It's become the third rail of American politics.

And so we seek to eliminate issues that would have the tendency to divert the jury from its task at hand. And that is, evaluating the extent to which, if at all anything Jones said actually affected these plaintiffs. Or whether their role as visible spokesman for gun safety, as they perceived it, brought them attention they didn't want.

THE COURT: So I understood, Attorney Sterling,
I thought you basically agreed on what such evidence
could be used for. And I thought as I understood it,
Attorney Sterling, you would only be offering such
evidence if it got to that, with respect to the

composition of Mr. Jones' audience, and how the audience responded to the topics and broadcasts.

ATTY. BLUMENTHAL: Your Honor, this is THE COURT: Oh.

ATTY. BLUMENTHAL: - Attorney Blumenthal.

Apologizes for the confusion about taking this one.

THE COURT: Sorry, you did tell me that.

ATTY. BLUMENTHAL: But I think your Honor has broadly characterized the testimony correctly. The reason why the testimony is relevant and vital, has nothing to do with Mr. Jones' character. In fact, Dr. Beirich at her deposition explicitly declined to characterize his character in this context. And said she would not be testifying as to his own beliefs.

Rather, it's relevant to describe his audience, specifically the context around it, and Jones' place within it, and his ability to communicate with it.

It - she'll be able to testify as to his prominence in these circles. His reach within these circles.

His ability to grow these movements. The trust that these segments of his audience have, and his message and his statements. And thus their resistivity to them. And it indicates who would believe those statements and how they would receive them. It also talks about - it also is evidence relevant to the ideology, the activities, the disposition of elements of his audience. And the centrality of these

specific messages. The hoax messages and narratives about mass tragedy events, specifically mass shootings. The centrality of those sorts of narratives to this element of his audience's world view, and their disposition to believe those narratives, especially coming from him. And also their disposition to act as a result of those narratives.

ATTY. PATTIS: Judge, I think that the - I'm sorry, I cut you off Attorney Blumenthal.

ATTY. BLUMENTHAL: And I've just one more thing. Sorry, your Honor, I'm -

THE COURT: That's all right.

ATTY. BLUMENTHAL: - not going at length. But the last thing I would say is, it's relevant to what exact message they were receiving from his words.

Dr. Beirich will be able to essentially describe how this element of Jones' audience will receive those messages, and what they will believe him to be saying when he uses the words that he does in the context that he does. And the claims at issue, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and the like. Are ones that really demand evaluation in context. This is important context for evaluating the plaintiffs' damages. Dr. Beirich can provide really helpful testimony to the jury on how they should deal with that.

And one more. Not to poke at Mr. Pattis at all.

But - or Attorney Pattis. Dr. Beirich is formerly of
the Southern Poverty Law Center. She does not work
there anymore.

ATTY. PATTIS: Well, we may explore why she left when we get - Judge, if you listen carefully to the proffer made by Attorney Blumenthal, I'd be stunned if you let 90 percent of that in. Much though that it may be appealing rhetoric in a discussion over beers about what ails the American public. It's entirely speculative. She's going to be able to say how ill-defined groups that she can identify by what - by some means would react to this and be triggered by it, and what they'd do with it.

This is a case where the Sandy Hook parents have chosen to attack Mr. Jones. It's their responsibility to prove if they can, that he proximately caused them damages. I think permitting her to testify in this speculative manner would undermine his rights to a fair trial. And I stand on the 4-3. I mean I think the plaintiffs are entitled to try their theory of stochastic terrorism. Let's see how far it goes.

But the basis that the motion was really a narrow 4-3, you may recall Judge, at one point we were going to submit a second motion on Dr. Beirich. I had somebody in the office fall ill. And so we

never did the Daubert Porter challenge, that much of what I'm arguing about now sounds like. So I want to just focus on the 4-3. As to the white supremist stuff. I think that's a third rail in American politics and is unduly prejudicial.

THE COURT: All right. So I do agree with the movant, that that kind of evidence can't be used to attack Mr. Jones' character, to prove that he was acting with any racial animus. Or to characterize him as a white supremacist or such. But I do think the evidence can be offered with respect to the - if there's a foundation for it. The composition of his audience and how the audience responded to the narratives. So, I'm going to deny the motion. Although I'm sure they'll be other reasons to object. Okay.

All right. Plaintiffs motion for order number 924. This is on the Google analytics. I have the defendant's omnibus objection at 941. And I have the plaintiffs reply at 949. Again, I don't know if any of these numbers have changed, but if so, tell me now.

ATTY. STERLING: Your Honor, no they have not changed. I'm being able to - I can now anticipate some of where the Court is going. So I have this one ready. So this is the motion to compel production of a Google analytics spreadsheet that was reviewed by

Free Speech Systems corporate designee Brittany Paz, in preparation for her deposition. Which was not brought to her deposition. And then when it was requested that it be produced because she was testifying based on it, it was not produced. And again, the defendants are indicating that they're not sure - they can't produce it, and it's possible that - well, that they can't produce it.

Those representations again, are not sworn.

This - I would say your Honor, this is a little bit different because here we're dealing with a corporate representative's testimony. It binds the corporation. So the fact that the corporation is unable to produce the basis for the designee's testimony, should bear some more significance.

The Court had inquired before, this is like the PQPR management agreement motion, in which we had moved to compel. The objection indicated that the document can't be produced. We've noted in reply, that that representation is made just simply by counsel in the pleading, but not by affidavit. And we have requested sanctions in the reply brief. So I'll stop there.

THE COURT: So this is the one, Attorney Pattis, were Blake Roddy said it doesn't exist?

ATTY. PATTIS: Yes.

THE COURT: Is that -

1 ATTY. PATTIS: Upon being -2 THE COURT: And just -3 ATTY. PATTIS: I cut you off. I'm sorry. 4 THE COURT: Just refresh my recollection as to 5 who Mr. Roddy is again. So I don't have to -6 ATTY. PATTIS: He works in the - well, in the 7 distribution network. So when people make orders 8 from the online stores and enterprise - he sort of a 9 gate keeper who would oversee that function. I don't 10 know if there are additional questions in that 11 regard, but that -12 THE COURT: No, I just -ATTY. PATTIS: - is his function there. And so 13 14 when this issue first arose, there were several 15 items. I contacted the corporate rep., she told me 16 that Blake had shown her this. I contacted Mr. Roddy 17 on several occasions. I will get you an affidavit or 18 this may be something where you want to hear from the 19 two of them. Because it's not at all clear to me 20 that Attorney Paz was correct in what she said based 21 on what I know of the Google analytics there. 22 But I will concede that she said what she said. 23 The problem I have is, that Roddy doesn't know what 24 she's talking about. And this is a confounding set 25 of factors that - that this is a confounding set of 26 factors.

THE COURT: So do I hear you saying you would

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1 like an opportunity to provide a counter affidavit 2 again? 3 ATTY. PATTIS: Yes. THE COURT: Are we looking at an evidentiary 4 5 hearing? What are we doing? 6 ATTY. PATTIS: Well I agree with Attorney Sterling, that the stakes are higher here, in that 7 8 Ms. Paz or Attorney Paz was the corporate rep. 9 could produce Mr. Roddy for a hearing by way of 10 video, I don't know that I can get him up here on 11 short notice from Texas. But I would like you to 12 hear from him and make your own evaluation as to his 13 credibility. It is entirely possible to me that 14 Attorney Paz made a mistake. The Court may recall, 15 there - the google - the topic of Google analytics 16 has been quite controversial in this case. 17 company continues to maintain it doesn't use them. 18 The Court's already made findings in various 19 other sanctions motions about that, that we're not 20 asking you to reconsider at this point. We obviously 21 disagree with them. But I'd like you to hear from 22 Mr. Roddy. 23 THE COURT: So are you also anticipating filing 24 an affidavit from the Free Speech System, I forget 25 his - the -26 ATTY. PATTIS: Mr. Schwartz? 27 THE COURT: Yes. Because the other one you were

1 saying that you would - that Mr. Schwartz would 2 search the records since he is -3 ATTY. PATTIS: I can ask him to do so. That hadn't occurred to me. That's helpful. I mean 4 5 presumably -6 THE COURT: Do you want me to just consistent because you're - Free Speech Systems is in 7 8 bankruptcy, right? So -9 ATTY. PATTIS: No, that's true. But I mean, one 10 of the agreements - I mean lifting stay, I now have 11 access to everybody. But Schwartz would be starting 12 at the top. So I would like the opportunity to 13 submit a brief affidavit for Mr. Schwartz and Mr. 14 Roddy. 15 THE COURT: And I would like to do that. only problem is, this - how do I say this? It would 16 17 have been helpful to have the evidence before today. 18 ATTY. PATTIS: It would -19 THE COURT: Because all I have -20 ATTY. PATTIS: I think I did make a pass and an 21 objection on timeliness grounds. I mean, we're on 22 the eve of trial. This is ample fodder for cross-23 examination. I'm not sure that this is something we 24 need to or should be litigating now. And it seems to 25 me that on this record, they'd have ample grounds to 26 impeach, and they could ask the jury to do something,

rather than have the Court do it. So, I would ask

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1 you to consider whether this is timely perfected. 2 THE COURT: And I will just state for the record 3 I will - I'm not in agreement with that position, 4 Attorney Pattis, because of all the activity that has 5 gone on with Free Speech Systems. It makes it sort of 6 impossible to get these kinds of documents when the cases are in bankruptcy and removed. I mean, like 7 8 you said, you might be in a better position now. But 9 in any event -10 ATTY. PATTIS: I might be. THE COURT: - I will enter the same order on 11 12 this. The same timeframe. 13 ATTY. PATTIS: Yes, Judge. 14 THE COURT: And we'll see what - we'll see - so 15 now, once you have the affidavit, what do you want me 16 to do? 17 ATTY. PATTIS: I will obviously provide it to 18 opposing counsel, and maybe we should meet and confer 19 about whether we think anything additional is 20 necessary. I suspect we will. But I think I'd like 21 them to see it. I - as your officer, Judge - I've

about whether we think anything additional is necessary. I suspect we will. But I think I'd like them to see it. I - as your officer, Judge - I've not discussed this issue with Schwartz. I've discussed it with Roddy. So I'm not as confident in making representations about what I'll be able to produce.

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ATTY. STERLING: Your Honor, Attorney Sterling.

I am trying to think about how we can do this

efficiently, because part of my concern is that here we are, our side is preparing for trial, and we are - this is going to impact our trial preparation as well. And I just - it seems to me that under the circumstances it is not we who should be prejudiced here.

So I understand that the Court is going to give the defendants an opportunity to submit an affidavit. I'm just struggling with how we can address that in time to know where we stand by opening arguments on Tuesday.

THE COURT: I agree. It's going to be very tricky. And I don't see how I assess credibility on affidavits either. What happens if I - I don't know.

ATTY. PATTIS: It doesn't strike me as a central part of either an opening statement or a rebuttal.

And so I think there may be an unrealistic sense of urgency about this. If it were that urgent, presumably it wouldn't have waited all this time to be perfected and argued. And so I hear what the plaintiffs are saying. But I'm less persuaded that the case is - that the opening of the case is affected by disposition of this.

THE COURT: I just think it diverts all our resourced to have -

ATTY. PATTIS: Well that it does.

THE COURT: - to have evidentiary hearings and -

1 ATTY. PATTIS: Well, Judge, when this issue 2 arose, I was engaged in collateral proceedings of a 3 pressing personal matter, over which I had no control. 4 5 THE COURT: Well, it looks like some of these 6 motions were filed back in mid-August, so I don't 7 know how much - and then we also had the bankruptcy 8 and the removal. So, it's challenging. 9 ATTY. PATTIS: And where I was unable - where I 10 was unable to have contact with the stayed -11 representatives of the stayed defendant as a matter 12 of federal law. 13 THE COURT: It's a challenge. 14 ATTY. PATTIS: One of the reasons that the -15 that Free Speech agreed to lift the stay, was to 16 provide me with access to people that I wouldn't 17 otherwise have access to. 18 THE COURT: All right. I have plaintiffs' 19 motion in limine. This is on the extent of the Sandy 20 Hook coverage. I have, I think it's entry number 21 932, but I'm not sure. Then I have the defendant's 22 omnibus objection at 941. And I have the plaintiff's 23 reply at 952. 24 ATTY. STERLING: Your Honor, I apologize. 25 missed that. What was the opening docket number?

THE COURT: I think it's 932. Let me look.

THE COURT: That's a good question.

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1 THE CLERK: Your Honor, it's 931. 2 THE COURT: 931. 931. This is regarding the 3 percentage or amount of Sandy Hook coverage. ATTY. STERLING: Yes. 4 5 THE COURT: Then I have the omnibus objection at 6 941. And I have the plaintiffs reply at 952. 7 ATTY. STERLING: Okay, your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Are those -9 ATTY. STERLING: Let's -10 THE COURT: Are those correct? 11 ATTY. STERLING: They are. 931. 941. 952. 12 THE COURT: Perfect. All right. Whenever 13 you're ready. 14 ATTY. STERLING: Okay. Yeah. So your Honor, 15 this is the motion to preclude evidence and argument 16 regarding maximum total purported coverage. 17 evidence on this from a whole range of witnesses, is 18 that - and actually Attorney Pattis just made the 19 point himself in connection with the request for 20 admission. Is that it's their position that they 21 don't know how many videos they created, or in 22 connection with the request for admission, all the 23 places that they were broadcast. 24 So - and this is testimony from corporate 25 designee's, Rob Dew, who said most of our video 26 library got wiped out. I don't even think God knows 27 all the videos because they're gone. They don't

exist anymore. Alex Jones. I don't know the number of total videos about Sandy Hook. Many videos have been reedited by others countless times. So there's no way for me to know. Alex Jones again. A lot of the live show was only archived on YouTube, and then that was taken down. There were over 30,000 videos', we don't save those videos, most of them.

The point being, your Honor. That we have identified some of the Sandy Hook coverage. But nobody knows the full extent of the Sandy Hook coverage by Alex Jones. And so an argument that the full extent is known, and then can be used to support a sort of a drop in the bucket argument that the defendants want to make. The defendants would like to say, that this is only a small percentage of their coverage. Of their - sorry, of their total all broadcasts.

And there's a number of problems with that argument. But the problem that we're flagging here, is that there just isn't a basis for them to say what exactly their claim is as to the — as to the amount of coverage. They can't say what the maximum amount was. They've given us that response over and over again. So that's the motion, your Honor. We're asking simply for a preclusion of that particular argument.

ATTY. PATTIS: Judge, this issue came up in

Texas. And I think the Court may have granted a similar motion at closing argument counsel for Mr.

Jones, confined himself to what was in the evidence.

And said that within the evidence, given the number of hours they were on the line, that what the jury was shown represented something like one tenth of one percent or one — one and half tenths of one percent of their total coverage. This is a problem that the plaintiffs in some respects created for themselves.

The Sandy Hook shootings occurred in 2012. They were broadcast then. They were broadcast in 2103. They were broadcast in '14, '15, '16, '17, '18. Mr. Jones was de-platformed in '18, at or about the time this suit was brought. They did not maintain a set of hard drives or a server with a history of their stuff -

THE COURT: Attorney Pattis, I'm sorry. I just want to get to understand something. Are you taking the position that there's a basis for an argument on the defense, that there is a percentage or an amount of the total amount of coverage? I mean, are you actually saying, putting aside fault of any party. Are you saying that there will be a basis for that argument?

ATTY. PATTIS: There will be a basis for what was admitted into evidence at trial. The testimony will be that they're on - they're on the air for

roughly 10,000 hours over this period. And the jury will have been shown 20 hours, 15 hours.

THE COURT: All right. So what they're shown versus how many hours on the air is one thing. But what existed versus how long they were on the air, is another thing.

ATTY. PATTIS: I don't think either side should be permitted to speculate about what existed. They can't say that there are hours, and hours, and hours that were destroyed, in part because they waited six years to bring the action. And no one took a step to preserve it at that point.

So I think it's a live issue for both sides. I think what we've - how we comment on the evidence that is offered. You will hear testimony that - from Mr. Jones, that this was not something that he covered often. That he covered it sporadically. And then you'll hear testimony, presumably, from him about the wide range of topics that he covered.

He doesn't know how often it was done. His stuff was published, or how often it was republished by others. I mean, for example, in the Texas trial, there's a small cottage industry of bloggers.

There's something called Knowledge First or Knowledge Fight. These people apparently live by loving to hate Alex Jones. And they pounce on every piece of video they can find. One of them even attended as a

paralegal, a deposition with Texas counsel to get more access to Jones. So we don't know what's been republished by whom. But I think there will be a certain number of videos offered. I expect to argue that the plaintiffs have spared no time or effort to develop their case. And this is the most damaging case they can find. All of it.

And that represents a minuscule portion of the total programming, in that if there were more, the jury would have been shown more. And it wasn't until 2018, for reasons of their own, which we'll explore at trial. That the plaintiffs brought this suit. If it hurt in '13, where was the lawsuit? If it hurt in '14, where was the lawsuit? If it hurt in '15. And some of these plaintiffs helped participate in the drive to de-platform Mr. Jones. And it was the de-platforming that deprived them of the archive that they used to rely on with Google.

ATTY. STERLING: Your Honor if we can come back to the issue in the motion. They just can't argue that there is a minimum number — excuse me, a maximum number here of videos. And one of the reasons that they can't argue that is because the evidence is going to be, that not only were these videos broadcast on Infowars.com, and PrisonPlanet.com, and Newswars.com. But they were broadcast on radio stations. There's a network of 150 radio stations.

And then they were republished again by Infowars employees on YouTube, and Twitter, and Facebook. So the idea that they can argue that there is a maximum total number, and that they know what it is. I mean, certainly there's a minimum. We can establish that there is a minimum. But we cannot establish the maximum. So the argument that they want to make, this sort of percentage-type argument, there is not going to be a basis for it.

ATTY. PATTIS: Judge, I haven't announced an intention to make a percentage-type argument. And I'll certainly object if the plaintiffs try to say it was everywhere always. That would be every bit as speculative. My suggestion, Judge, would be to defer ruling on this. I certainly understand the plaintiffs' position, and let's see what the evidence develops. I think this is a time of trial motion. I certainly don't intend to make a representation in my opening statement that X percentage of their content and no more was devoted to Sandy Hook. I do not intend to do that.

THE COURT: All right. So I am going to grant the motion. No evidence or argument regarding the total amount of Sandy Hook coverage or percentage, or proportion of Sandy Hook coverage. Doesn't mean -

ATTY. PATTIS: By either side?

THE COURT: That's what I said. That's the

1 ruling. 2 ATTY. PATTIS: I didn't hear it that way. 3 THE COURT: No evidence or - you'll get it in writing. No evidence or argument regarding the total 4 5 amount of Sandy Hook coverage, or the percentage or proportion of Sandy Hook coverage. So certainly 6 7 whatever evidence is put in, everyone can comment on. But no percentage or proportion can be argued. 8 9 ATTY. STERLING: Your Honor? 10 THE COURT: Um-hum. ATTY. STERLING: May - so, I think I do need to 11 12 make a clarification here. So we have an expert who 13 is disclosed to testify regarding the spread, the 14 reach of this content. 15 THE COURT: I understand that. 16 ATTY. STERLING: Okay. And so I just want to 17 make sure that this ruling isn't foreclosing that 18 testimony -19 THE COURT: Absolutely not. It's ruling on the 20 issue that was raised in the motion. So -21 ATTY. STERLING: Okay. 22 THE COURT: No percentage - no argument that 23 it's a minuscule, for example, a minuscule portion of 24 what he covered over the 10,000 hours and the like. 25 So whatever evidence ends up coming in otherwise, of course is - can be commented on during closing 26 27 argument. But -

ATTY. PATTIS: Judge, he will testify that it was a minuscule portion and his recollection. And I think that's fair testimony.

THE COURT: The rulings the ruling, Attorney Pattis, so...

ATTY. PATTIS: Well, we'll get to his testimony when we get to it.

THE COURT: Attorney Pattis, listen to me carefully. The ruling is the ruling. If someone, and it's the law of the case, and I know you disagree with it. And that's fine. We don't want a situation where I have entered these orders, and someone tries to circumvent the orders. I don't think that would be appropriate.

So I think you heard you suggesting that he is going to testify along the lines of what I just said was not permissible. I cannot accept that. So, I assume I misunderstood?

ATTY. PATTIS: No, you didn't misunderstand.

I'll ask to be heard outside the presence of the jury when he's on the witness stand. I think he's entitled to testify from his recollection.

THE COURT: So we have a record. We're on the record now. I'm entering the order in writing. I will personally, if I need to, personally if you're suggesting to me that he is not going to abide by this order, I can personally canvas him prior to

1 taking the stand. Because I don't want any 2 misunderstandings about -3 ATTY. PATTIS: You should do so, Judge. THE COURT: - what this ruling is. 4 5 ATTY. PATTIS: You should do so. And I'd like 6 you to hear from him on the stand, so that I have the 7 record that I need for appeal. 8 THE COURT: I'm not going to make an offer of 9 proof through him. I'm simply going to make sure 10 that he understands what the Court order is, and that 11 he is not going to -12 ATTY. PATTIS: I think that would be 13 appropriate. 14 THE COURT: Beg your pardon? 15 ATTY. PATTIS: That would be an appropriate step 16 for the Court to take. 17 THE COURT: An appropriate or inappropriate? 18 ATTY. PATTIS: An appropriate. That would be 19 the right thing for the Court to do. 20 THE COURT: All right. Because I assume that we 21 all have our roles, and we all have clients, and we 22 all have our job to do. And I also know that you 23 will do your job and explain to your client these key 24 rulings. But I am happy to do it in addition to, but 25 I will tell you this Attorney Pattis. I'm not going 26 to have a contempt situation in the courtroom, where 27 an order is blatantly violated. So I assume -

ATTY. PATTIS: I don't intend to violate your orders.

THE COURT: No, I was referring to your client.

But I think you'll do what's necessary, and

whatever's necessary. But I'm not going to have
this is a simple order. It literally couldn't be

simpler. It's probably 20 words, and I am not going

to have a situation where we now have to go off

course from the middle of the trial, and I have to

deal with a contempt of court situation with your

client, where he's blatantly disregarding an order.

ATTY. PATTIS: Judge, I hear you. I also watched portions of the Texas trial, and there were moments that were difficult for all involved. So I think it would be the right thing. I don't want you to misunderstand my word. For the Court to review that topic with Mr. Jones prior to his testimony. I would encourage you to do so.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. We can take up one more, or would you like to take the 15-minute recess now? Does it matter to anyone?

ATTY. PATTIS: It doesn't matter to me, Judge.

THE COURT: Does anyone need a - Attorney Sterling, go ahead.

ATTY. STERLING: I'm fine, your Honor. Why don't we do one more?

1 THE COURT: Okay. Why don't we do plaintiffs 2 872. This is on the Soto versus Bushmaster case. 3 Defendant's objection at 888. And the plaintiffs reply at 905. Just tell me if I got it right first. 4 5 ATTY. STERLING: One second, your Honor. some reason I can't find it -6 7 ATTY. PATTIS: I don't have my docket sheet in front of me, Judge, so I can't -8 9 ATTY. STERLING: That is -10 THE COURT: I'm sure Attorney Sterling will 11 correct it if it's wrong. 12 ATTY. STERLING: Well, that is one of the ones 13 with corrected filings. 14 THE COURT: Okay, good. That's what I want to 15 make sure I rule on the right thing. 16 ATTY. STERLING: Yup. And unfortunately though 17 Judge, my wonderful organizational system is not 18 suppling it to me. 19 THE COURT: All right. I can find it. Just 20 give me one moment. 21 THE CLERK: Your Honor, I believe they're the 22 last two filings. 961 says corrected motion in 23 limine precluding questioning evidence or argument on 24 Soto. And 962 is a corrected reply. 25 THE COURT: That's it. Whenever you're ready. 26 ATTY. STERLING: Just a housekeeping matter. 27 With regard to the original motion in limine and the

1 original reply, would it - is it - we can withdraw 2 those in addition to filing corrections. I take it the Court is just not going to review 872 -3 THE COURT: Well, I had originally reviewed the 4 5 original ones, but I -6 ATTY. STERLING: Uh-huh. THE COURT: - then reviewed the new ones, and -7 8 ATTY. STERLING: Okay. 9 THE COURT: My only concern, I didn't know if 10 Attorney Pattis had reviewed them because -11 ATTY. PATTIS: I'm prepared to argue them, 12 Judge, based on my discussion with Attorney Sterling. 13 THE COURT: Right. Well that's why I checked 14 earlier, because there were a lot of filings today, 15 and honestly, I had to do a sort of a side by side to 16 see what was changed. It wasn't that easy. And I 17 just wanted to make sure Attorney Pattis was good to 18 go. All right -19 ATTY. PATTIS: Despite the difficulties in this 20 case, Judge, dealing with Attorney Sterling has been 21 nothing but delightful. 22 THE COURT: All right. Whenever you're ready, 23 counsel. 24 ATTY. STERLING: All right. Your Honor, so 25 this - especially with the corrections we made this 26 morning, this is just an extremely straight forward 27 issue. What we did is moved in limine to preclude

evidence questioning our argument regarding Soto versus Bushmaster, which is a case in which some of the plaintiffs in this case were involved as representatives for the estates and plaintiff Bill Sherlach was involved as a result of a loss of consortium claim.

There is no reason, your Honor, to get into Soto versus Bushmaster at all anymore. And this does — this is one of the motions that is directly implicated by the law of default.

THE COURT: All right. So I just want to back up for a minute. When I originally ruled, I think in the defendants' favor, on the issue of the inquiry, at the depositions and on this issue. That was when we still had a full trial as to Genesis

Communications, who's no longer a party. Is that correct? I just want to make sure that -

ATTY. STERLING: Yes. Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So at that point they were a party. It was a full trial. It wasn't a hearing in damages. And I sort of looked at it as what's likely to lead to admissible evidence in that light. So, go ahead.

ATTY. STERLING: So your Honor, and that's exactly the point. Is that we have the default having entered, there are a number of consequences that flow from that. Liability is established in

1 favor of the plaintiffs, and nobody disputes that. 2 Liability includes both fault and causation. 3 So that is done. Then the allegations of the complaint are also established in favor of the 4 5 plaintiffs. It's tantamount to an admission. And 6 there is a disagreement between the parties about the difference between material allegations and 7 8 allegations. We've cited the Smith versus Schneider 9 case, which I think is going to be the leading 10 Connecticut Supreme Court case to guide the Court on these issues. 11 12 And I can get into that. I didn't realize that 13 we were going here, so if the Court decides that a 14 break is necessary, you know - just please let me 15 know. 16 THE COURT: I think it's almost 3:30. So I 17 think we should try to break it up now. 18 ATTY. STERLING: Yup. 19 THE COURT: So we'll take a 15-minute recess. 20 ATTY. STERLING: Okay. Thank you, your Honor. 21 (Recess. Resumed.) 22 THE COURT: We are back on the record. Attorney 23 Sterling had the floor. And I think she was starting 24 to address Smith versus Schneider. 25 ATTY. STERLING: Yes, your Honor, I was. 26 And before I do that. This motion, I think it's 27 incredibly straight forward. I think it's also

really, really important. It's important for a couple different reasons. One is there is an exhibit on the defendant's exhibit list of a video titled Will Bushmaster lawsuit reveal Sandy Hook hoax. I have not reviewed that video. But it - clearly this is an area that they want to get into. Mr. Jones has talked repeatedly about the 73-million-dollar settlement in Soto versus Bushmaster. We expect this is an area he's going to want to get into.

So, I just want the Court to be aware of what we expect to be Mr. Jones interest in bringing this into the case, and why it is so important not to. So let me turn back to default law.

I was addressing Smith versus Schneider, which is a 2004 Connecticut Supreme Court case. That case is very helpful on the question of what does a default mean in the context of no notice of defenses being filed. Any contested evidentiary hearing in damages. In that case, there was a defendant who was no longer a party. So a non-party defendant who was alleged to be a co-conspirator with two party defendants. Those two-party defendants were defaulted. And the Court considered a number of challenges by them to the damage's awards in favor of the plaintiff.

The one that I think is most - I mean there are a number of helpful directions from the Court, but

one of the things that the defendants did was, they challenged the award of CUTPA punitive's to the remaining party's defendant. And in examining that challenge, what the Supreme Court did is, it looked to the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint. And it saw that the complaint alleged a breach of fiduciary duty by the non-party defendant, and conspiracy by the non-party defendant, with the remaining defendants.

Based on those allegations, it affirmed the trial courts award of CUTPA punitive damages. And the reason I raise all that, your Honor, is because that directs the Court about the scope of what the complaint establishes. So the complaint here, we know it establishes proximate cause. That's really not in dispute at all. And the defendant's have conceded that that is not in dispute. And I can cite to there is a docket number 892 at page 2.

Defendants agree that they might not - may not challenge the threshold proposition that they have caused damages to the plaintiffs.

So it's undisputed. Proximate cause is decided. And other allegations of the plaintiff's complaint are also effectively admitted. That is what Smith versus Schneider is teaching. Is that allegations like conspiracy and intent, are already established. All that remains an issue, and again, this is black

letter default law is the amount of damages.

So the question is not whether the plaintiffs are damaged, it is how much are they damaged? What is the impact on them in terms of their reputation and wellbeing? It's not whether the contacted issue is reprehensible, it is how reprehensible was it.

And that's the frame for deciding whether evidence about something like Soto versus Bushmaster could possibly be admissible. The Court's ruling had initially recognized that Soto could be a - I think the Court had allowed discovery questioning about Soto, in terms of would it have been a source of harassment or were there other sources of harassment for these plaintiffs.

And that ruling was appropriate at the time, but it cannot guide the admissibility of this evidence.

Now, because now we're in a full default posture.

And as the Court correctly pointed out, that ruling was made when there was an un-defaulted defendant.

So I'll stop there, your Honor. I think - well, let me stop there.

THE COURT: Attorney Pattis.

ATTY. PATTIS: Well the Supreme Court had made it clear in such cases as <u>Mahoney versus Batura at</u>

110 Connecticut 184, 196. That what - there must be a causal connection in whole or in part between the act of negligence and the injury. Plaintiff is

ordinarily entitled, the Court goes on to say, to at least nominal damages following an entry of default. But it does not follow that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment to the full amount of relief claimed. It still has to show how much of the judgment prayed for he is entitled to.

And the significant thing, Judge, is an Appellate Court decision. I believe it's Richie versus Main Street Stafford. The Appellate Court went on to say, we conduct a plenary review of the pleadings to determine whether they are sufficient to establish a cause of action upon default. And we will have -

Main Street, that was the Appellate Court. Didn't that say that the default establishes the liability for the distress, and that the trial court improperly considered that the plaintiffs' emotional distress might have been caused by other sources? Isn't that what that case clearly said?

ATTY. PATTIS: In part. But it also in the analysis of damages said, we conduct a - and this is a significant case. I thought we'd get to it later. The money question in this case is going to be,

Judge, whether the Court gets the right to assess an open-ended punitive damages and CUTPA. And that's the ball that everyone's eye needs to be on. And we

will have a motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case, even in the face of the default, because there has never been a case in Connecticut history that warranted CUTPA damages for protected speech about politics. CUTPA is a trade practice claim, or a trade practice act And Mr. Jones made no defective - made no comments. He didn't engage in unscrupulous advertising about the products he sold. He may have made outrageous claims about the world, and people may have purchased his items. And in plaintiff's version of reality, the reason he made those claims was to drive people to purchase his products. But those claims are not claims about products.

And so this is a misapplication about CUTPA.

And what's significant about the Richie Main Street case is that the notion that there can be a plenary review of the pleadings to determine whether the pleadings are sufficient to establish a cause of action after default. So we don't take - that's one point. We don't take the position, and I think that the Richie case goes on to say, entry of a default is not the equivalent of admissions of facts pleaded.

And so this has been an issue that has come up repeatedly in jury selection.

We don't think anything other has been established then the fact that Mr. Jones was

defaulted as a result of the Courts conclusion that his and his counsel's compliance with discovery was an intentional flouting of these Courts rules.

So I think that with respect to Soto Bushmaster, and I think we're kind of verging into arguments on later motions. The Soto Bushmaster claim, and I think Mr. Jones does have an interest in this, Judge. I've heard him talk about it on the air. I know his mind. I think from his - as his advocate, my perspective is motive and interest in the outcome is never collateral. I was startled during jury selection to see the plaintiffs - I didn't - you never know how your adversary's going to approach a case until you get into a courtroom.

They raised in vior dire, people's reaction to guns and gun violence, and whether they had strong positions on it. It will be one of our contentions at trial that what - that these plaintiffs became in effect, I don't know that we'll use the language because we have been defaulted. But they became public figures, in most cases willingly. And sought to leverage the loss of their children into a privileged position and a contentious debate. And to the degree they suffered the scorn of others. What did they expect?

And so it seems to me that they placed themselves and their counsel has prided us with

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notice that they intend to place at the center of this case, the plaintiffs' attitudes towards gun violence. And thus, are they overstating the claims that they have here against Mr. Jones, because of their advocacy with respect to guns. And doesn't the 73-million-dollar settlement against Remington suggest that this is a powerful motive for them in bringing this suit.

So we think it's central. We think it's in the case. I don't know that there's an identity of interest. For example, I've not studied this settlement in Soto v. Bushmaster yet, to know whether there was a sum allocated for punitive or compensatory damages. But at some point, I think Mr. Jones would say, how much is enough? And if you've already received 35, 40, 50 million dollars in compensatory damages as a result of the suffering from your child's death, cause presumably by the unscrupulous advertising of gun makers, how do you distinguish that from what you're claiming third parties did in response to what Mr. Jones said. And isn't the fact finder entitled to conclude that at some point enough is enough. And I think Jones would like to - I think Jones would like me to argue that.

So I disagree with the proposition that a default is the functional equivalent of a request to admit that has been admitted. I think the cases are

clear on that. I don't think the default becomes a blank check for the plaintiffs to ask for anything. They still have to prove their case. And I think the fact that other damages and other sources of damages are never collateral. That's why we have laws about preexisting conditions and jury charges, and about superseding intervening causes. And the plaintiffs' need to be held, in our view, in this case, to the burden of proving the claims that they have made, and that Mr. Jones has been defaulted on.

Are you suffering intentional infliction of distress as a result of what Mr. Jones said or did?

Let's see your proof. And if there are too many links in a chain of causation, such that it becomes essentially speculative, we'll ask the jury to reject it and we'll say that these are people who have entered the fray with respect to guns and gun violence in a major way. They wrangled - they wrangled Soto and Bushmaster to the ground to the 73 million dollars. There's no stopping them.

THE COURT: But Attorney Pattis, how do I - if I were to do what you wanted me to do on this, I would be going against the law that I'm bound to follow. I mean, it can't be clearer that it would be improper for the Court to allow evidence of other potential sources of, for example, the emotional distress. And that's what you're -

ATTY. PATTIS: Why would it be improper? My understanding is, that if there are superseding intervening causes as we claim there are, and if the Court says that the plaintiff is entitled, they must show how much of the judgment prayed for they're entitled to. And I think in showing how much, we fairly get the right to put on other sources.

THE COURT: But what about what the Court says in Richie versus Main Street, that said the trial court improperly considered the other sources?

ATTY. PATTIS: I think it did so because that
THE COURT: Because the default established the
liability for the distress.

ATTY. PATTIS: I read it a little differently, and perhaps incorrectly, Judge. I thought that it — that one of the things it said there was, there was no evidence linking the third party, the corporation there. And so I thought that was the null of the holding.

THE COURT: Attorney Sterling.

ATTY. STERLING: So Richie versus Main Street absolutely says that Judge. It says that the trial court erred in considering another potential cause of emotional distress in an emotional distress claim.

And then that was a case where it was a landlord who evicted tenants, and then wrongfully continued the eviction. So let me - first of all Judge, I mean I

1 think the argument you just heard from Attorney 2 Pattis is exactly, exactly why we made this motion 3 and why it needs to be granted. That is just - it doesn't have to do with the facts of the case, and it 4 5 certainly can't be made post-default, when all that 6 remains an issue is the amount of damages. ATTY. PATTIS: Well, I don't -7 8 ATTY. STERLING: May I -9 ATTY. PATTIS: I cut you off. I'm sorry. 10 ATTY. STERLING: And the amount of damages, it 11 is established that the plaintiffs' damages are 12 caused by the Jones defendants wrongdoing as alleged 13 in the case. I mean that's what a host of different 14 cases say. And we filed a bench brief on causation, 15 your Honor, just to try to make sure that we had put 16 a collection of law on this issue since it does seem 17 to be -18 THE COURT: So Attorney Sterling -19 ATTY. STERLING: 20 THE COURT: - the defendant can contest the 21 extend of the damages, correct? 22 ATTY. STERLING: The defendant can contest the 23 amount of the damages. 24 THE COURT: Right. 25 ATTY. STERLING: What he cannot do - what he 26 cannot do, is ignore the fact that the default 27 establishes that Mr. Jones misconduct was a

1 substantial factor. So that means that questioning 2 as to whether someone else potentially contributed to 3 the plaintiffs' emotional distress, is not 4 permissible. 5 ATTY. PATTIS: I don't see the case as saying 6 that. ATTY. STERLING: That's -7 8 ATTY. PATTIS: I don't see a case that says 9 that. We have the thin skulled -10 THE COURT: Well, why don't we let Attorney 11 Sterling finish and I'll give you another 12 opportunity to respond. 13 ATTY. PATTIS: I apologize, Judge. 14 ATTY. STERLING: Sure. Sure. So this is Richie versus Main Street 110 Conn. App. 15 at 224. And it says, although we agree with the 16 17 plaintiffs, that the Court - let me see. Hold on. 18 Okay. So it's although we agree with the plaintiffs 19 that the Court improperly considered that Patricia 20 Richie's emotional distress may have been caused by 21 other sources. So that's the key. The Court improperly considered that the plaintiff's emotional 22 23 distress may have been caused by other sources, 24 because the default established liability for the 25 distress. 26 That's the key language in Richie, and it's very 27 helpful. I mean there are other causation cases that

we can also - we have also cited the Court to. But Richie is helpful because it is in the context of emotional distress. So - and it flows, your Honor, from a number of places in default law. So first of all, liabilities established. That necessarily means causation is established. Second. The holding of a case like Smith versus Schneider, which says that the facts alleged are admitted. Even, even if we accept Mr. Pattis' argument that there is some distinction between material facts and facts, which I don't think there is under the case law. I think that they're used interchangeably. But even if we accepted that, causation is always going to be crucial in material.

So that is established. And then - and I think it is very helpful to think about it in terms of substantial factor. That it cannot be disputed that the plaintiffs' emotional distress, that Mr. Jones misconduct, was a substantial factor leading to the emotional distress. And that there's going to be questioning and arguing about that, that - this is really important, and because it's going to -

THE COURT: Attorney Sterling, I understand the issues and I'm reading the cases the same way that you're reading the cases.

ATTY. STERLING: Yes.

THE COURT: But that doesn't mean that the defendants have to roll over. Right. They can still

1 cross-examine the witnesses on their emotional 2 distress. Right. The - and contest the extent of 3 what is claimed. 4 ATTY. STERLING: Yes. They can contest the 5 severity. 6 THE COURT: Attorney Pattis. 7 ATTY. PATTIS: There is another case, 8 Temple versus Woolworth 167 Connecticut 631 636. 9 There must be a causal connection in whole or in part 10 between the act complained of and the injury. Then 11 it cites Mahoney versus Buckman. See also Cardona 12 versus Ballantine at 160 -13 THE COURT: I agree with you too Attorney 14 Pattis. But here causation is admitted, and proximate cause is already established under the law 15 16 that I have to follow. 17 ATTY. PATTIS: Something -18 THE COURT: I'm just following the law. 19 ATTY. PATTIS: We agree that they've pled 20 causation. But they have to prove the extent of it, 21 and you can't rule out other sources and say, well, 22 turn a blind eye to everything else, we sued 23 Remington and got 73 million dollars. That was just 24 a frolicking detour. Why'd you sue them? Well, they 25 hurt us too. And can you distinguish those damages 26 from the damages that Mr. Jones caused. And by the

way, have you heard of James Fetzer's book, nobody

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died at Sandy Hook? Did that damage you? How about Mr. Piecznik. How about the professor down in Florida who lost his job for questioning whether Sandy Hook occurred? How about Wolfgang Halbig.

All these other people. There was a tsunami of activity out there, and what you'll learn at trial, Judge, is almost nothing is directly linked to Alex Jones. The link will come through highly tenuous expert testimony by people who have a political agenda, which is different from Mr. Jones. And so this case is going to be transformed from a case that should be about proximate cause and the sources of injury, into a political vendetta.

And I don't think that's appropriate. And I don't think this Court does either. What's interesting in the cases is, did the Court say plaintiffs are not necessarily entitled even to nominal damages, which is why the Appellate Court conducts a plenary review. And we will say that at the time of the closing to the plaintiffs' case, if you take every allegation in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there simply is no CUTPA claim here, period.

THE COURT: Well, you'll file your motion at the appropriate time on that.

ATTY. PATTIS: When the time comes, yes. Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: Listen, I am declining the invitation to disregard the law that I am bound to follow. So I am granting the plaintiff's motion.

All right. So I have the plaintiffs' motion at 873 on former defendants. Defendants' objection at 891.

And the plaintiffs reply at 907. So again, I want to see if any of the recent filings change those entry numbers.

ATTY. STERLING: It did, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

ATTY. STERLING: So the corrected motion is at docket number - oh, I'm sorry. Let me just give you what I have, your Honor, and then the corrected motion is at 957. The corrected reply is at 960.

And the objection is at 891.

THE COURT: Okay. Whenever you're ready.

ATTY. STERLING: Yes, your Honor. So this is the motion in limine to preclude evidence and argument regarding resolutions with former defendants. This takes us into very much the same territory as the previous motion, which is we're now dealing with the effects of the default. And so the argument is similar, in fact the overlap is - I mean, partly concerned that they wanted to introduce the Soto settlement. And the Court as I understand it, has just ruled that they cannot.

Specifically - so, and this also comes out of

the last argument. One of the allegations of the complaint is that the Jones defendants conspired with Wolfgang Halbig and Mr. Sklanka. That is throughout the body of the complaint. Under Smith versus
Schneider, that is established now. And so one of the Mr. Halbig's misconduct is attributable and attributed to the Jones defendants by the default.

That - now let me turn away from that. I just wanted to make that point because I think it hasn't been made sort of crystal clear yet. And it's an important consequence of the default. With regard to settlements and argument about settlements with Mr. Halbig and any others, that's just inadmissible under our basic case law. That can't come in. Settlement amounts can't come in. Releases can't come in.

So this motion addresses that. I don't think that requires much argument. The other issue that is raised by this motion is evidence and argument regarding whether the plaintiff should have sued third party harassers. This gets into that proximate cause issue that we were just talking about in connection with the last motion. Which is essentially an argument by the defendants, that they should be relieved of responsibility for the plaintiff's emotional distress, because there were other actors. And that's exactly the argument that Richie disallows them.

1 So that's it in a nutshell, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Attorney Pattis. 3 ATTY. PATTIS: The plaintiffs want it both ways. Mr. Halbig's conduct is attributable to Jones because 4 5 he's a co-conspirator presumably Jones is responsible 6 for that as well. Halbig settled his case over his objection for the policy limits. Genesis 7 8 Communication settled at the Deck J phase in Federal 9 Court, presumably for the policy limits. If these 10 people are co-conspirators and everybody's in presumably for one another's misconduct, why isn't 11 12 Jones entitled to the benefit of that when 13 substantial monies have changed hands already? 14 THE COURT: Attorney Sterling. 15 ATTY. PATTIS: Because you're either a 16 co-conspirator or you're not. 17 ATTY. STERLING: Your Honor -18 THE COURT: That was addressed in one of the 19 cases I read I thought. That issue. 20 ATTY. STERLING: It - so our law is just crystal 21 clear that settlement agreements and numbers do not come in. And there are - I mean, situations 22 23 certainly where a co-defendant resolves a case, but 24 the settlement amount does not come into evidence. 25 ATTY. PATTIS: We disagree in this particular 26 case because Mr. Halbig was deemed to be an agent of 27 Mr. Jones. He's a co-conspirator. They settled - I

1 know what the sum is. Halbig has contacted us, told 2 us what it is. He showed us his objection to the 3 settlement. His instructions to his lawyer not to settle. But they settled over his objection. 4 5 sum was enough for the plaintiffs, why doesn't it begin - if that's enough for a co-conspirator, why is 6 it for co-conspirator A, why isn't is enough for 7 8 co-conspirator B. And why should we be precluded 9 from making that argument? 10 THE COURT: Do you want to respond to that, 11 Attorney Sterling? 12 ATTY. STERLING: It's Black Letter Law, your 13 Honor. 14 THE COURT: I agree. ATTY. PATTIS: Well, Black -15 16 THE COURT: I agree. 17 ATTY. PATTIS: - Letter Law are settlement 18 offers, not amounts. Not in cases where there are 19 co-conspirators and plaintiffs are - or defendants 20 are entitled to an off set. THE COURT: The offset - the offset? 21 22 ATTY. PATTIS: If you were damaged a million 23 dollars by the bad conduct of other people, and you 24 took 400 from somebody else, are you still entitled 25 to a million dollars from each person? There's only 26 so much harm. This isn't a blank check or a lottery 27 ticket.

1 ATTY. STERLING: Your Honor, absolutely not. 2 That's just not the case law. 3 THE COURT: No, it's not. I'm going to grant the motion. Did we - we have 871. 4 ATTY. STERLING: Hold on. 871 is not the ones 5 6 that the Court just addressed. 7 THE COURT: 871 is the plaintiffs motion 8 precluding evidence regarding the basis for the 9 Courts default ruling, and the defendant objected at 10 893, and no reply was filed by the plaintiff. 11 ATTY. PATTIS: Judge, we independently moved for 12 permission to put it in. So these motions may have 13 crossed. 14 THE COURT: Well, it was the plaintiff's motion 15 at 871. Defendants' objection at 893. And I had, I 16 thought I had Mr. Ferraro reach out, and I thought I 17 was -18 ATTY. PATTIS: No. I thought we filed a 19 separate motion in limine for permission to put in 20 the basis for the default. ATTY. STERLING: The defendants did, it's just a 21 22 different set of motions. 23 THE COURT: Right. 24 ATTY. PATTIS: Judge, I view it as the same 25 issue. I guess that's my - the only point I'm trying 26 to make. 27 THE COURT: Right. So in 871, the plaintiff's

filed a motion precluding evidence regarding the basis for the Courts default ruling, and the defendant objected to that motion at 893.

ATTY. STERLING: Yes. And your Honor, there is a reply in support of that. It's docket number 904.

THE COURT: I thought 904 was in - so I have a plaintiff - I have the defendants' motion at 865 regarding the disciplinary default. Then I have the plaintiff's objection at 889. And then I have the defendant's reply at 904. I have three different sets, and I'm going to deal with each of them because it's too easy to be confused.

So, why don't I go through the three sets now, and at least we can get the number in right. But I'm going to hear argument separately and I'm going to rule. Unless somebody is withdrawing a motion, I've got to do it this way.

So I have again, 871 filed on July 14th.

Plaintiff's motion in limine precluding evidence regarding the basis for the Court's default ruling.

Then I have the defendant's objection at 893. And let me see the date that that was filed, because I did not write down a date. That was filed on July 26, 2022. And I was told that no reply would be filed on that set of motions, because we had other similar sets of motions. Then I have defendant's -

ATTY. STERLING: Your Honor -

78 1 THE COURT: Go ahead, Attorney Sterling. 2 ATTY. STERLING: We ended up filing a reply, 3 which is docket number 904. So we had thought we would not file a reply. That is correct. And then 4 5 we ended up filing a reply because of some of the 6 things we observed in the Texas trial. 7 THE COURT: Okay. I reviewed 904 in connection with another set of motions, but that must be my 8 9 mistake. So then I - let's go through this. Then I 10 have defendants' motion at 865 that was filed on July 12th. Motion in limine regarding the admissibility 11 12 of the Court's ruling entering a disciplinary 13 default. Then I have the plaintiff's objection to 14 that at 889. Unless it changed. 15 ATTY. STERLING: No, your Honor, it did not. 16 THE COURT: And then did the defendant file a 17 reply? 18 ATTY. PATTIS: No. 19 THE COURT: Okay. Then I have the issue on the

preliminary charge on the default. I have the plaintiff's entry at 876. I have the defendant's objection at 894. I have the plaintiff's reply at 934. I have the defendant's sur-reply at 941. And I have the plaintiffs sur-sur-reply if that's that lingo at 954. So did any of those entry numbers change? I'm going to think they did.

ATTY. STERLING: Your Honor, actually those

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1 entries did not change. 2 ATTY. PATTIS: Yeah, I don't think they did. 3 ATTY. STERLING: The one thing is, I have the Jones defendant's July 25th objection as docket 4 5 number 892. 6 THE COURT: It is 89 - okay. Well, let me just 7 see. I had 892 and I crossed it out and put 894. 8 But that could again be my mistake, which is why I'm 9 doing this. No, I think 894 I have objection, 10 defendant's objection to motion in limine for 11 preliminary jury charge corrected. 12 ATTY. STERLING: Oh, okay. 13 THE COURT: I think it was originally at 892 and 14 then it was corrected at 894. 15 ATTY. STERLING: Okay. So I'll get my hands on 16 the corrected version. That's my mistake. 17 THE COURT: All right. So just give me one 18 second. So let's start with 871, which is the 19 plaintiff's motion in limine to preclude evidence 20 regarding the basis for the Courts default ruling. 21 ATTY. STERLING: Okay, your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Take your time. 23 ATTY. STERLING: Thank you. 24 THE COURT: This is why I had everything laid 25 across my desk in stacks and literally I just had to 26 go from one stack to the next without any deviations. 27 ATTY. STERLING: My only issue here is that my

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stacks have moved, so now I have to track them down in different places. Your Honor, so basically this motion is both we anticipated that the Jones defendants would want to explain and argue the default in their presentation. And so the first relieve that this motion asked for is that they not be permitted to do that. Then the second motion — the second relief that this motion asks for, is what we anticipate some of their arguments will be at trial.

So for example, criticism of the default ruling coming in Mr. Jones testimony. Criticism of the Court coming through Mr. Jones or potentially other witnesses. Arguments that Mr. Jones was exercising his First Amendment Rights, and - which would contradict the default ruling. He's not permitted to do that because the First Amendment is longer an issue. So there are a number of different types of arguments that we anticipated. And I think I should - let me spend a little more time on that, just because I want to make sure that we address all of the different kinds of arguments -

THE COURT: So can we -

ATTY. STERLING: Yes.

THE COURT: On this one can we just - so there's three areas that I'm understanding. Can we take them one by one, and then -

1 ATTY. STERLING: Yes. 2 THE COURT: - you make your argument and let me 3 hear Attorney Pattis response. So the first thing 4 that you want to preclude is evidence or argument 5 that the Jones defendants satisfied their discovery 6 obligations by making substantial production. Do you 7 have anything to add to that. 8 ATTY. STERLING: I'm just asking myself if that 9 is the complete relief that we would want in that 10 connection. Certainly, we don't - that argument 11 should not be admitted. I think other - just trying 12 to think if my adversary will find a different way to 13 frame it. 14 THE COURT: Well, I'm just pulling the language 15 off of what you want in this motion. 16 ATTY. STERLING: Right. 17 THE COURT: So number one, you -18 ATTY. STERLING: Right. 19 THE COURT: - want the Court to preclude 20 evidence or argument that the Jones defendant 21 satisfied their discovery obligations by making 22 substantial production. I just don't know if you're 23 adding anything to that before I turn it over to 24 Attorney Pattis. On that issue before - then we have 25 number two, number three. 26 ATTY. STERLING: Yeah. Your Honor let's see.

Yes, I am adding something to that because I think

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that we had argued it throughout the motion. We did include it in that list at the very end. But arguments that the default is unfair. So in that, if the Court would - I mean we certainly meant to include that and what we were trying to do is give examples of this kind of argument. So absolutely we'd want the Court to preclude evidence or argument that the Jones defendant satisfied their discovery obligations by making substantial production. But we would also like the Court to preclude arguments that the default is unfair.

THE COURT: Well that would be something that would be argued to the Appellate Court, and I'm not the Appellate Court. Attorney Pattis.

ATTY. PATTIS: No, but we are bound by article first second six of the Connecticut Constitution.

That says in all prosecutions or indictments for liables, the truth may be given in evidence and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts under the direction of the courts.

So, that's - there's no case, Judge. And I'm aware of the broad policy prescription against jury nullification. There's no case that has given that clause of the state constitution, the gloss that I would like it to. But this issue arose periodically in jury selection, where in voir dire my colleagues would say such things as, it's been established that

Mr. Jones violated - that this is no First Amendment defense here. And I would object. And from time to time the Court sustained those objections. In one early instance, which I realized isn't necessarily binding as evidence. But in one early instance, saying that's not what the default did. The default was as a result of - it was a disciplinary default.

And I think jurors are going to wonder about that. And there is a substantial, potential prejudicial impact of their believing that the merits of these cases have been reached. They were never reached.

THE COURT: We could make that clear in an instruction that the merits were - but that's another issue.

ATTY. PATTIS: As to - as to the Texas trial, I think Attorney Sterling was a close student of that trial, as was I. I did see Mr. Jones make these sorts of claims that she is referring to here. And these were highly contentious moments at trial.

And so we believe that this issue should be put before the jury. That they should see it was a disciplinary default. We believe that it's fair commentary on the default. That's what earned the liability here. And we think that jurors have a role in deciding both law, in fact, under our state constitution in a case involving liable, as this

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THE COURT: All right. So on the first issue, the motion is granted. There will be no evidence or argument that the Jones defendants satisfied their discovery obligations by making substantial production, nor can they attack at the trial court level during the jury trial, that the decision was unfair.

Number two. Evidence or argument that prior rulings in this case were the result of judicial bias or plaintiffs' counsel lying in court. Anything to add to that, Attorney Sterling.

ATTY. STERLING: No, your Honor.

ATTY. PATTIS: Judge, I don't intend to make any argument to that effect. I mean, I don't know why they filed that. We talked about that - I'm not going to attack my adversaries. I'm not going to impute the integrity of counsel or the Court in this case.

ATTY. STERLING: And -

THE COURT: Well, Attorney Pattis, and I know that. It never occurred to me that you would do that. But these rulings bind your client.

ATTY. PATTIS: No, I understand that. that, Judge.

THE COURT: I - he needs to be crystal clear on - and this is not complicated. It is literally not

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complicated. If he needs to write it out, each of 1 2 these - there's not that much. If he needs to write 3 it out ten times over and over again until he understands it. Then that's what he needs to do. If 4 5 you need to meet with him for - I'm not going to 6 speak to that. But, this - I'm not going to have those kind of problems. This is a different 7 8 courtroom, different law, different everything. All 9 right. 10 And so that last one is, evidence or argument that holding the defendants accountable for damages 11 12 is unfair and/or offends the First Amendment. 13 Attorney Sterling. 14 ATTY. STERLING: Yes, your Honor. And I do want 15 to go back. This goes to the argument we'll be 16 making with regard to the preliminary instruction. The Court had indicated that it would entertain a 17 18 potential jury instruction to say that this case 19 was -20 THE COURT: I haven't really -21 ATTY. STERLING: Okay. 22 THE COURT: There's a lot of things that can be 23 said, or that - I want to deal with this separately. 24 That's how it's going to be. Sorry to say. 25 ATTY. STERLING: I will stay on track then, your 26 Honor. 27 I have - what I want to do is elaborate a

bit on the kinds of argument that we anticipate would come under that category.

THE COURT: Under this third category?

ATTY. STERLING: Under this third category. So and this is part of what we learned from watching the Texas trial. That they're - we would expect testimony and argument that Mr. Jones was penalized already for his conduct regarding Sandy Hook, through de-platforming. Other lawsuits. And the cost of defending those lawsuits. And Mr. Pattis - Attorney Pattis has already made some of those arguments here.

So that is all testimony that - or argument that undercut the default ruling. Challenges the default ruling. And so that's part of what we are trying to address here.

THE COURT: Attorney Pattis.

ATTY. PATTIS: We don't agree that it undercuts or challenges the default ruling. The plaintiff will testify that they want Mr. Jones held accountable. I suspect they will testify that they left it to their lawyers to determine the amount the juries been conditioned that they're going to be asking for a quote, huge, huge amount. This could be the largest verdict in another iteration in Connecticut history.

They want Jones held accountable. They want to claim that others similarly situated shouldn't be committed to do what he has done. I think the juries

1 entitled to know what the cost of this has been to 2 him, as they calibrate accountability. 3 THE COURT: You looking to respond? 4 ATTY. STERLING: Your Honor, no. 5 THE COURT: I'm granting the motion. Let me 6 move onto the next one. Just give me one moment. 7 ATTY. PATTIS: Is this the tenth or eleventh 8 topic? Judge, I'm losing track here in my notes. 9 THE COURT: I think we're closing in. 10 we have two left. I think this might be number ten. 11 So now we have - and so I'm going to hear argument. 12 The first one, and then argument on the second one. 13 All right. And then rule when I'm done with both 14 arguments. So I have defendant's motion 865. 15 is on the disciplinary default issue. Then I have 16 the plaintiff's objection at 889. I had the filing 17 as 904, but now I've crossed that off my list. 18 then we have all the other filings with respect to 19 the plaintiff's request for the preliminary charge. 20 So why don't I start with you, Attorney Pattis. 21 So you want - tell me what you want. You want -22 with respect to the disciplinary default. What are 23 you looking for? 24 ATTY. PATTIS: To admit to the defaulted self as 25 an exhibit so that they can read it. 26 THE COURT: I can't hear you. 27 ATTY. PATTIS: I apologize. To admit the

default ruling as an exhibit. So they can read it and understand why liability was found in this case. The fear is that they'll be an implicit assumption that will bolster the plaintiff's claim that this was outrageous conduct. And that the Court on a previous occasion was so outraged by the speech, that it entered the liability default, thus encouraging jurors to overstate the value of the case.

I think that there is a universe in which this item can be admitted without running a fowl of the previous ruling. I concede Judge, that a lot of the arguments overlap in these two contexts. But to avoid an implicit suggestion to the jury that this case must be worth a lot because he was already found liable. I think would be a disservice to Mr. Jones and Free Speech Systems.

argument in this. You're asking in this motion for the transcript to be admitted as an exhibit. I am going to deny that. Whether you're asking for particular language if a preliminary charge is given, that you want language that makes clear that it is a disciplinary default for failure to comply, as opposed to a determination on the merits. Is a different issue. But this - your motion here just asks for my transcript to go in as an -

ATTY. PATTIS: It wasn't a transcript, I think

there was a - I thought there was a marginal, a notation ruling as well. Doesn't matter, I think it's the same ruling regardless of the form.

THE COURT: Whatever order it was. I thought there was actually an order and a transcript. But whatever the Courts articulation on it, I'm not going to allow that as an exhibit. So now we have the last, all the filings. There's six filings that I went through. And whenever you're ready, Attorney Sterling.

ATTY. STERLING: Yes. I think the arguments today have made it clear exactly why we need a charge like this. We need a charge like this so that it's clear to the parties and the Court and the jury, as we go forward. As we start opening statements. As we do evidence. What is an issue and what is not an issue?

We proposed a really quite simple charge, based on the allegations of the complaint. And that's the charge that we're asking here. And I think one of the reasons why it's so important to give it is, because there just cannot be a grey area here. It needs to be clear to everybody what is established. This charge does not address every single aspect of what the default establishes. It actually is tailored -

THE COURT: Attorney Sterling -

ATTY. STERLING: Yes.

THE COURT: I don't recall in my 20 years on the bench ever laying out in a preliminary instruction when we're giving them all the logistics of how they operate as a jury. And how the mechanics of the trial. I don't ever remember telling them ahead of time, well, here, these are the causes of action and here are the elements. And this is what you need to listen to when you're waiting for the evidence. I've never done it. In fact, I've never been asked to do it. So why would I do it now?

ATTY. STERLING: So I think there are a couple reasons to do it now, your Honor. Number one is, because this - it is important that the jury know what is for them to decide and what is not. And some of those things -

THE COURT: All right. So why not just say, like we did - this is a hearing in damages. You are not to consider liability and end it there. You job is to assess the damages.

ATTY. STERLING: Your Honor, the Court could do something like that. Certainly - no, no, I understand that. I think that one of the issues with doing that, is that that would then leave open the question for the Court and counsel about what is resolved. So I do understand the Courts point that there are two separate things going on here. Number

one is, what is the minimum that the jury needs to hear. Number two is, are the Court and counsel crystal clear on what is resolved by the default.

And in my -

THE COURT: Well, that doesn't require a preliminary charge. Right?

ATTY. STERLING: That's correct.

THE COURT: You're saying that you want us, the Court and counsel to be on the same page. But you're also saying but for us to be on the same page, we have to tell the jury. And that's not - that doesn't follow.

ATTY. STERLING: So your Honor, what I am trying to say is, it is most important that we all be on the same page. I think that we have already told the jury about some of the conduct, and about the fact that liability is established. Conveying this much more, which is really not much more than what the Court originally did when it introduced the case. Is important. And it's not intended to be prejudicial, judge. What it intended to do is set the table so that they understand the issues.

THE COURT: Just give me one moment, please? So I just lost where I was. So give me the entry number of the docket number that you're laying out your proposed language. If you don't mind. I had it and I clicked out too many times and lost it.

1 ATTY. PATTIS: I think it's 934. 2 ATTY. STERLING: Sorry, your Honor. 3 THE COURT: 934. ATTY. PATTIS: That's what my notes reflect, but 4 5 I may be wrong. 6 ATTY. STERLING: I'll get to it, Judge. 7 THE COURT: That's it. I think. It was 8 revised, right? 9 ATTY. STERLING: Yes. 10 THE COURT: So 934 is the most recent iteration. 11 ATTY. STERLING: Yes. I mean, we filed a 12 version with citations to the complaint in the 13 sur-reply, but it's verbatim the same as what's 14 proposed. 15 THE COURT: Right. 16 ATTY. STERLING: In 934. 17 THE COURT: What else, Attorney Sterling? 18 ATTY. STERLING: Your Honor, I don't think I 19 have anything to add. I mean, this is intended to be 20 faithful to the complaint, establish the sort of 21 basic parameters for the jury. Obviously, I'd be 22 happy to go back and forth with counsel if there are 23 words that he objects to. And I also acknowledge 24 that the Court has discretion about a charge like 25 this. 26 THE COURT: Yeah. I don't like it. It's way 27 too long. And - all right. But Attorney Pattis -

ATTY. PATTIS: The Court -

THE COURT: But I think something is necessary, and it sure would have been nice if you could have been on the same page. But Attorney Pattis, what do you -

ATTY. PATTIS: The Court has the benefit of having sat through almost all of the voir dire. But for a couple hours one day when there was a meeting. We had a joint non-argumentative statement that we agreed upon. I don't recall a juror having difficulty with that statement. I don't recall vior dire being particularly difficult. I think we all expected it to last a lot longer than it did. I think it lasted seven, eight days. I believe that statement was sufficient to apprise -

THE COURT: Ron tells me it was seven. Is that right, Ron? I thought it was eight, but it was actually seven. And I think we ended up getting 12 and lost one. So I can't disagree with that. But, listen, I think that the proposed language is not even close to what I would say. But here's the truth of the matter. I sure don't want to suggest because it would not be true. I sure don't want to suggest to the jury that I made any substantiative determinations on any of these facts or causes of action. Because that would just not be true. But I think there's probably a way to do it. Telling them

not to speculate and just say the Court has determined that liability is established for reasons you don't have to concern yourself with. And you should not speculate on. And your job is to address damages. Something along those lines. And I don't think I'm opposed to laying out what the basic causes of action are by name. But I'm not looking to do anything this detailed.

I don't think there really can be any, based on the rulings that we've gone through today, and I know we still have the two minor ones. But I don't think that anyone here is not understanding what the evidence will entail. And I just don't see a need for something this long.

So do you want -

ATTY. PATTIS: Judge, give us an opportunity to digest what has occurred here this afternoon, and perhaps Attorney Sterling and I can compare notes tomorrow afternoon with the aim of reaching an agreement. We did so on the preliminary voir dire. If you think more is necessary then what was given then, then I will work with Attorney Sterling to try to come up with something.

THE COURT: Not much more. Just, you know, just a - but I just want to be careful like I said, not to suggest that the Court substantively addressed the legal issues. But I don't want them to speculate.

But I would like to just say these are the causes of action or something along those lines, so they have some minimal guidance. And if you want to say something along of the lines that, in light of the Courts ruling, Mr. Jones is precluded from raising defenses. You know, follow the law, and see if you can come up with something along those lines. But not too long.

ATTY. PATTIS: Understood.

THE COURT: Okay. So I'm going to deny the motion without prejudice for you to see if you can reach agreement. Listen, if you can't, I'm going to have to be left to my own devices and come up with something. I'd much prefer that you put your reasonable heads together. You can do better than I can probably, so I'm going to keep my fingers crossed.

ATTY. PATTIS: Judge, you said there were two more things, and I didn't know what those were. You just said it a couple of minutes ago, and I thought we covered it all.

All right. Any - did I miss anything?

THE COURT: No, the two - yeah - yeah - yeah.

The issue with Attorney Paz. With the Google

analytics. And then the issue with the Dew Bidondi

text messages. Those are the two -

ATTY. PATTIS: So I've already, during the break

1 I put out a request for affidavits to my contacts 2 down there. 3 THE COURT: Right. ATTY. PATTIS: And my understanding is, I've got 4 5 to get them in Thursday. I'll get them in as 6 promptly as I can. 7 THE COURT: All right. So those are the two 8 issues that I have to rule on. Everything else on 9 the long list, I think we were able to get through. 10 Mr. Ferraro, anything that you can see that I missed, 11 or any other housekeeping issues? 12 THE CLERK: No, your Honor. Not for the 13 motions, not for those pending motions. 14 THE COURT: Perfect answer for this time of day. 15 ATTY. STERLING: Oh, your Honor, I apologize. 16 I've got one more. 17 THE COURT: Oh, Attorney Sterling. 18 ATTY. STERLING: I know. I know. Docket number 19 897. It was never ruled on. It's on consent. It's 20 a late expert disclosure motion. 21 ATTY. PATTIS: Yeah. Attorney's fees guide. ATTY. STERLING: Yeah. 22 23 ATTY. PATTIS: Is that right? 24 ATTY. STERLING: Yeah, me and Chris. 25 ATTY. PATTIS: Yeah - no, we - Judge, in the 26 event that a - in the event that punitive - in the 27 event the jury elects to award punitive damages, I

1 think the Courts going to have to decide the 2 reasonableness of attorney's fees. And I think we've 3 agreed that that would take place post-trial, and there'd be ample opportunity to depose that expert, 4 5 when the press of other business wasn't upon us. I 6 don't know, Alinor, did I overstate that? 7 ATTY. STERLING: No. That's - that's correct. 8 We have agreed that reasonable amount of attorney's 9 fees would be deferred until after this proceeding. 10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 ATTY. STERLING: And I just wanted to make sure 12 because that's been a loose end. 13 THE COURT: I just did it. 14 ATTY. STERLING: Excellent. 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 ATTY. STERLING: Thank you. 17 THE COURT: All right. So I just - very 18 quickly. Ron will confirm our jurors on - today's 19 Tuesday - on Thursday. And let's hope that we don't 20 have to pick on Monday. Okay. But just keep in mind 21 that there is a possibility that we would have to 22 pick Monday morning. But let's keep our fingers 23 crossed. All right. 24 ATTY. STERLING: Your Honor. I apologize. I've 25 got one more thing to raise. 26 ATTY. PATTIS: Just deny this one, Judge, 27 without even hearing it.

ATTY. STERLING: I know I run that risk. I am concerned, I remain concerned that even with all of the Court's rulings, that there may be some lack of clarity. For example, about what can be argued in opening statement. You know, I think it's clear that causation cannot be argued.

THE COURT: Attorney Sterling, why don't you talk to Attorney Pattis, and see if there are any - I mean for heavens sakes, it's opening statement. I can't imagine it's going to be issue. If it in fact, your concerned that somethings going to rise during the opening statement, then we'll have you come in Tuesday at 9, just let Ron know and I'll deal with it Tuesday at 9. Okay.

ATTY. STERLING: I appreciate that.

THE COURT: I would rather not do - and Attorney Pattis, I've already made an note to myself, I've diaried it, to make sure that I sort of canvas your client on the issue that we talked about. If there's anything else that you think needs - obviously outside the presence of the jury, but if there's anything else along those lines that you would like me to say on any of the other rulings. And I know you're going to do your job, but if you think that it would be helpful for the Court to do so, talk to Attorney Sterling and let me know before - let me know by Friday. Okay.

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                ATTY. PATTIS: He's not likely to testify before
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           the end of next week. So you need to know this
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           Friday, Judge?
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                THE COURT: I do, because I have such a long
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           list of things to do, not just in this case -
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                ATTY. PATTIS: Okay. Got it - got it - got it.
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           If you need it, you need it. Got it.
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                THE COURT: I have to - yeah. Okay. All right.
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            Stay well everyone. We're adjourned.
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                ATTY. STERLING: Thank you, your Honor.
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    (The matter concluded).
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DKT NO: X06-UWY-CV186046436-S : COMPLEX LITIGATION DKT

ERICA LAFFERTY

: JUDICIAL DISTRICT WATERBURY

V.

: AT WATERBURY, CONNECTICUT

ALEX EMRIC JONES

: SEPTEMBER 6, 2022

DKT NO: X06-UWY-CV186046437-S

WILLIAM SHERLACH

v.

ALEX EMRIC JONES

DKT NO: X06-UWY-CV186046438-S

WILLIAM SHERLACH

v.

ALEX EMRIC JONES

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify the foregoing pages are a true and correct transcription of the audio recording of the above-referenced case, heard in Superior Court, G.A. #4, Waterbury, Connecticut, before the Honorable Barbara Bellis, Judge, on the 6th day of September, 2022.

Dated this 8th day of September, 2022 in Waterbury, Connecticut.

Darlene Orsatti

Court Recording Monitor